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Summary 
The majority of research on merger and acquisition (M&A) in Scandinavia is related to 
domestic M&A. In addition to a lack of research on cross-border M&A for the Scandinavian 
market, the many obstacles associated with this form of take-overs make it fruitful to 
investigate the phenomenon in Scandinavia. This thesis investigates the announcement effect 
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on target firm shareholders’ value in 
Scandinavia in the short-term. A short-run perspective is chosen in order to isolate the impact 
of one particular event by preventing cofounding events during the event period. Evidence on 
long-run effects is therefore left out of the analysis. A sample of 98 Scandinavian target firms 
has been analyzed in the time span between 1997 and 2011 in order to find empirical evidence 
that supports the hypothesis that the announcement of cross-border M&A generates value for 
target firm shareholders.  
The announcement effect of cross-border M&A activity is in this thesis evaluated on the basis 
of the shareholders’ value approach. This approach compares shareholders’ value, measured 
by stock returns, subsequent to the announcement of cross-border M&A to an estimated value 
that is calculated based on the assumption that the M&A had not occurred. Since the purpose 
of this thesis is to look at the effect of M&A announcement on shareholders’ value, the impact 
of M&A on other stakeholders
1
 is not examined.  
The event study methodology has been applied in order to detect abnormal returns during an 
event period of five days, where the abnormal return is the difference between the observed 
return of a security and the return of a security that are expected to be observed if no event 
occurs (Peterson, 1989). The event period over which the abnormal returns are examined 
spans from two days prior to the announcement of cross-border M&A to two days after the 
announcement of cross-border M&A.  
This study finds significant and positive average abnormal returns on both of the days prior to 
the announcement day. These results indicate that news about mergers and/or acquisitions on 
some occasions reached the market before the actual day of the announcement, possibly due 
to information leakage or rumors. In addition, a significant and positive abnormal return is 
found on the first day following the announcement day, indicating that news about mergers 
                                                          
1
 Other stakeholders include employees, customers, management and the society 
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and/or acquisitions in some cases reached the market after trading hours which made it 
impossible for market participants to react to the news on the actual day of the announcement.  
The cumulative average abnormal returns of the securities in the sample represent an estimate 
at the time of the M&A announcement of the expected discounted value to shareholders 
generated by the take-over (Campa & Hernando, 2004). The empirical evidence of this study 
suggests that target shareholders in Scandinavia experience a statistically significant 
cumulative average abnormal return of 14.7% during the five days under which the returns of 
the stocks are examined. The main conclusion of this thesis is that the announcement of cross-
border M&A generates value to target firm shareholders in Scandinavia in the short-run. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the past 30 years, the complex phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions has attracted 
substantial interest from a broad range of management disciplines. Even though studies 
provide evidence of mixed performance to the broad range of stakeholders involved in 
mergers and acquisitions, the phenomenon continues to be a highly popular form of corporate 
development (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). Merger and acquisition (M&A) can in short 
be defined as the combining of two or more firms, or transactions that result in the transfer of 
ownership as well as management and control rights from one company to another. The 
company that is being acquired is called ‘’the target’’, while the other is called ‘’the acquirer’’ 
or ‘’the bidder’’. Throughout this study the terms ‘merger’ and ‘acquisition’ will be used 
interchangeably referring to all transactions in which the businesses of companies are 
combined through the purchase of the majority of shares or assets, or through a merger 
(Wübben, 2007, p.6). This is common for many studies on the subject due to the fact that the 
net result of a merger and an acquisition is often the same (Ma, Pagán & Chu, 2009). Using 
the definition of M&A, cross-border M&A can be explained as M&A where the head office 
of the target is located in another country than the ultimate parent of the acquirer or merging 
company (Buch & DeLong, 2004). While the majority of M&As involve firms within the 
same country, the share of M&As that involve firms headquartered in two different countries 
is constantly increasing (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath & Pisano, 2004). 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are part of the fundamental mechanisms of industrial 
globalization. Even though the driving forces behind cross-border M&A vary by sector, there 
are some factors that have been seen to evidently encourage cross-border M&A. Prolonged 
economic growth increases the capital available for industrial purchases abroad and attracts 
inward investments at home. Technological changes, like the new information technologies, 
make cross-border business expansion easier and more practical. Government policies, such 
as investment liberalization, privatization and regulatory reforms, make it easier to access 
targets for acquisition and tend to increase the number of M&As. Cross-border M&A can be 
beneficial to both host and home countries if the acquisition leads to increased company 
performance and profits without undue market concentration. Such benefits include 
revitalizing bad performing firms and local economies, create jobs, and drive technology and 
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productivity growth (Kang & Johansson, 2000). M&A can thus influence the common good 
in various ways, including industry concentration and monopoly, international competiveness, 
productivity growth, and technology transfer (Bruner, 2002).  
Empirical findings suggest that foreign-owned firms on average pay higher wages than 
privately-owned local firms. This has shown to be the case in both developing countries and 
developed high-wage countries. Reasons for this might be that workers must be compensated 
to overcome the preference of working for domestically-owned firms, or because the 
acquiring firms pay higher wages to attract better workers due to the firms’ limited 
understanding of the local labor markets. Domestically-owned firms are on the other hand 
more knowledgeable, and can identify and attract better workers without paying them higher 
wages. A higher degree of foreign ownership may additionally affect the average level of 
wages in a country or industry because of positive wage spillovers to domestically-owned 
firms. The positive effect on wages in the host country may also reflect the impact of foreign 
firms on the aggregated demand of labor (Lipsey, 2002).  
 
If foreign-owned firms are more efficient than domestically owned firms, their superior 
productivity may spill over to locally-owned firms in the industry or related industries. The 
positive productivity spillovers may emerge from domestically-owned firms copying the 
operations of the foreign-owned firms, or because domestically-owned firms are forced to 
raise their efficiency due to competition from foreign-owned firms (Lipsey, 2002).  
 
In addition to the positive spillover effects on wage and production in the host country, 
foreign-owned firms’ activities may also raise the export propensities of domestically-owned 
firms. Studies find that greater export activity by foreign-owned firms increases the likelihood 
that domestic firms will export (Lipsey, 2002).  
 
Technology spillovers from cross-border M&A may provide externalities that should have a 
positive effect on the economic growth in the host country. Inflows of physical and human 
capital generated by cross-border M&A increases the productive capacity of the host country, 
and contribute to the positive effect on the economic growth (Johnson, 2006). 
 
While home country consumers might gain from cross-border M&A because of imports of 
cheaper goods produced by foreign-owned firms, host country consumers might gain from 
 
 
3 
 
more efficient production of goods and services sold locally and from the weakening of local 
producer monopoly positions (Lipsey, 2002).   
 
Even though increased cross-border M&A activity may be desirable to the host country due to 
its positive effect on productivity and economic growth, there are some host country losers 
from the participation of foreign firms. In some cases, small or inefficient firms are forced to 
contract or leave the industry because of enhanced competition. Cross-border M&A may 
result in an increase of physical capital in the host country, which increases the production 
capacity. Some of the production which now takes place in the host country may replace 
production which formerly took place in the home country so that the investing firm reduces 
its production in the home country. This may result in shutting down or selling a plant in the 
home country. This may in turn result in a decline in the home country exports (Lipsey, 
2002). 
Studies suggest that many of the positive effects, such as increased productivity and economic 
growth, which result from cross-border M&A also result from domestic M&A. However, the 
risk of increased market concentration is higher in domestic M&A than in cross-border M&A. 
Domestic M&A may on the other hand make firms more effective in competing with foreign 
rivals (Caves, 1987). 
Worldwide cross-border M&A activity increased tremendously, both in scale and value, 
during the 1990s. In 1998 alone, the value of cross-border M&A increased by 86%. Even 
though the pace of growth slowed down the following year, the value of cross-border M&As 
is still increasing (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001). 
According to data collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012), worldwide cross-
border M&A activity continued to increase during the last decade, and there are no signs 
indicating that this trend will stop in the nearest future. 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
Along with the increase in cross-border M&A, studies on the topic have also increased. 
However, the majority of research on M&A is related to domestic M&A. The body of existing 
research is in addition mostly concentrated on the UK and US markets (Goergen & 
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Renneboog, 2004). The increasing globalization of business has heightened the opportunities 
for engaging in cross-border M&A, and calls for a better understanding of the opportunities 
and challenges of firms engaging in cross-border M&A (Shimizu et al., 2004). Even though 
studies on cross-border M&A have increased, there have only been a few studies for the 
Scandinavian market. In addition to the lack of research on cross-border M&A for the 
Scandinavian market, the many obstacles associated with this form of take-overs make it 
interesting to investigate the phenomenon in Scandinavia. 
Primary stakeholders can be defined as stakeholders who bear some form of risk as a result of 
having invested something of value in a firm. While primary stakeholders include capital 
suppliers, employees, other resource suppliers, customers, community residents and the 
natural environment, this thesis will only focus on the value created for the capital suppliers 
which will be addressed as shareholders in the remainder of this thesis (Hillman & Keim, 
2001). The effect of M&A on one type of stakeholders may be very different from the effect 
on other types of stakeholders. Industry output will in many cases contract following an 
M&A, and will therefore decrease consumer’s surplus, which is the difference between the 
value a consumer places on a unit of consumption and how much he actually has to pay for it 
(Varian, 2006, p. 250). The effect of M&A on consumers can thus be negative due to 
increased prices as a result of a decrease in industry output. Industry profits will on the other 
hand rise because of increased efficiency from cost rationalization
2
, and M&A may thus 
effectively transfers wealth from consumers to firms (Polasky & Mason, 1998). 
A common objective of all firms is to enhance shareholders’ welfare, which is usually 
synonymous with creating value for the shareholders. M&A can be seen as a way to try to 
maximize shareholders value through creation of special capabilities or achievement of 
competitive scale (Bruner, 2002). This thesis studies the announcement effect of cross-border 
M&A on Scandinavian target shareholders’ value. In order to measure the success of an 
M&A, this thesis will compare shareholders’ value, by examining stock returns, in the period 
surrounding the announcement of the merger or acquisition to an estimated value which is 
calculated based on the assumption that the merger or acquisition has not occurred. This 
approach links the business goals of the firm solely to the financial goals of the shareholders, 
which is to maximize the stock price (Wübben, 2007, p.13), but has the advantage that the 
effect of M&A is easy to observe (Campa & Hernando, 2004).  
                                                          
2
 See section 2.3.1 
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Given all possible economic effects of cross-border M&A
3
, an ideal analysis should include 
effects of cross-border M&A on other components of the Scandinavian economies in addition 
to the effect on private finances. However, due to the scope of this study and limited access to 
available data, the effect of cross-border M&A activity in this thesis is evaluated solely on the 
basis of the shareholders’ value approach. 
When measuring the announcement effect of M&A in the short run, there will generally be no 
information other than the news of the merger or acquisition, and the observed returns during 
the event period are therefore entirely due to this news as opposed to measuring the effect in 
the long-run where there is always a risk of cofounding events during the period when stock 
returns are examined (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). Evidence on long-term effects of M&A 
demonstrates that M&A lead to a decline in share prices over several years subsequent to the 
take-over. This may be due to the fact that market participants often overestimate the potential 
gains from a take-over when the bid is announced, and revise their expectations downwards 
when more information on the transaction is released. This explanation for the evidence on 
negative long-term effects of M&A implies that take-over activity destroys shareholders’ 
value on average and fails to fulfil the expectations (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). 
Campa and Hernando (2004) look at the value generated to shareholders by the announcement 
of M&A involving firms in the European Union over the period 1998-2000, and find that 
target firm shareholders’ wealth increases in the period surrounding the announcement date. 
However, when M&A includes two firms from different countries, M&A generates lower 
value, especially in industries that have been under government control or that are still heavily 
regulated (Campa & Hernando, 2004).   
According to data collected from Datastream, the total number of cross-border M&A in 
Scandinavia increased from 85 to 221 between 1997 and 2011
4
. The increase in cross-border 
M&A in Scandinavia is a motivational factor for exploring whether M&A announcements 
create value for the shareholder of Scandinavian target firms in the short run. Previous studies 
suggest that target shareholders value increases in the period surrounding the day when the 
acquisition is announced (Bruner, 2002). However, according to our knowledge, there is no 
evidence that the same is true for the Scandinavian market. This thesis will therefore 
investigate the short-term effect of cross-border M&A on target shareholders’ value in 
                                                          
3
 See Introduction 
4
 See appendix A for total number of cross-border M&As in Scandinavia in the time span during 1997 and 2011 
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Scandinavia by using financial data from 98 Scandinavian target firms in the period from 
1997 to 2011, and will thus measure success of cross-border M&A based on quantitative 
information as opposed to qualitative information, which is usually obtained from interviews 
or questionnaires of people involved or affected by an acquisition or a merger (Wübben, 
2007, p.11).  
The event study methodology will be applied in order to examine abnormal returns 
surrounding the announcement date of M&A, where an abnormal return is the difference 
between the observed return of a security and the return of a security that is expected to be 
observed if no event occurs (Peterson, 1989). A significant positive or negative cumulative 
abnormal return during a period of five days surrounding the announcement of cross-border 
M&A means that the announcement of cross-border M&A has either a positive or a negative 
effect on target shareholders’ value in Scandinavia. In order to estimate the market model 
parameters used to calculate the abnormal returns, SPSS is used as statistical software in this 
thesis, while Excel is used to calculate abnormal returns. Due to the choice of methodology 
applied in this thesis, the effect of M&A on various measures of operating performance like 
income, firms’ sales or profits will not be examined. This thesis will focus on the effect of 
cross-border M&A in the short-term assuming stock market efficiency instead of the long-
term approach which assumes that the effects of events take time before they are incorporated 
into the stock prices (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). The short-term announcement effect of 
M&A on shareholders’ value is interesting to investigate since the share prices will reflect 
investors’ expectations about the firms’ prospects. A potential examination of the long-term 
effect on share prices would on the other hand disclose whether the anticipated gains actually 
exist or are overstated (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008).  
 
Taking previous studies from the European and US markets into consideration, the following 
research question will be investigated in this thesis: 
Will the announcement of cross-border M&A generate value for target firm shareholders in 
Scandinavia in the short-run? 
The announcement effect of cross-border M&A on shareholder value will reflect changes in 
the expected future cash-flows to shareholders due to the positive effects which may emerge 
from a take-over. An investigation of the announcement effect of cross-border M&A will thus 
be fruitful for firms that consider engaging in cross-border M&A since it represents the best 
estimate of the expected discounted value generated by the merger or acquisition. Value 
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creation for the shareholders of the target and acquiring firms generated by an M&A will 
however only be a partial measure of the net increase in welfare of the stakeholders (Campa 
& Hernando, 2004). Since the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the announcement effect 
of cross-border M&A on target shareholders’ value, the impact on other stakeholders will not 
be examined.   
 
1.2 Delimitations 
 
First of all, since the majority of literature is related to domestic M&A, this thesis will solely 
concentrate on cross-border M&A. Secondly, the sample of firms being investigated is 
narrowed down to only include Scandinavian firms. Thirdly, this research has been limited to 
target firms. The announcement effect of cross-border M&A on Scandinavian acquiring firms 
will therefore not be analyzed. Lastly, as mentioned in the previous section, this thesis will 
only focus on the short-term effect of the announcement of cross-border M&A on 
shareholders’ value, and will therefore leave out the long-term approach. The choice of time 
interval under which the announcement effect is measured will be justified in chapter 5.  
 
This thesis will be organized in the following way: Chapter 1 offers definitions, the problem 
statement and delimitations. Chapter 2 provides a thorough description of the observable 
trends in the history of M&A, an explanation of different types of M&A, a description of 
different theories on why firms choose to engage in M&A, main obstacles of M&A and an 
overview of cross-border M&A in Scandinavia. Chapter 3 delivers a literature review of 
previous research on the effect of M&A on shareholders’ value, and in chapter 4, the data 
selection and final sample will be explained. Chapter 5 describes the event study methodology 
and test statistics applied in this thesis. Chapter 6 provides the reader with the empirical 
results. Chapter 7 and 8 gives suggestions for further research and the conclusion. 
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2 Theoretical and empirical background 
 
2.1 Types of M&A 
 
In the theory of mergers and acquisitions, there are different types of M&As to consider. 
Whether an M&A is related or unrelated is perhaps the most important distinction between 
the different types of M&A. Horizontal and vertical M&As can be classified as related 
M&As. In the matter of horizontal M&As, the acquirer and the target firm operates in the 
same industry and on the same industry level. In this way, multinational enterprises can 
strengthen their competiveness in their core businesses. In vertical M&As, firms operate in 
different stages in the same industry. Vertical M&A is typically an M&A which includes 
firms with a buyer-seller relationship. Conglomerate M&As are transactions which occur 
between firms that operates in different business sectors without a specific connection. These 
types of transactions are often characterized as unrelated M&As (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2001).  
An M&A can be characterized as friendly or hostile, depending on the attitude of the target 
company’s management or board of directors. The takeover is considered to be friendly if the 
target company’s board of directors recommends accepting the offer from the acquiring firm, 
while the take-over is considered hostile if the board rejects the offer. In the case of a hostile 
take-over, the acquiring firm does not have the opportunity to access the target firm’s detailed 
financial data. This is a disadvantage for the acquiring firm since the only information it can 
obtain about the target company will be the information which is publicly available. The 
situation is different in a friendly take-over, where the target company usually gives the 
acquiring firm most or all of the detailed finance data. The majority of cross-border M&As 
are friendly. Almost 95% of cross-border M&As were friendly between 1990 and 1999 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001). Information on sub deal 
types of 3425 cross-border M&As in Scandinavia in the period from 1997 to 2011 reveals that 
only 7 of the 3425 take-overs of Scandinavian firms in the period were hostile (Thomson 
Reuters Database, 2012).  Tender offers are characterized as offers made directly to target 
shareholders in order to overcome resistance from incumbent managers. Tender offers are 
often an indication of greater confidence in the acquirer’s ability to realize synergies from the 
acquisition (Loughran & Vijh, 1997).  
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Cross-border M&As are either inwards or outwards. This thesis will focus on inward cross-
border M&As in Scandinavia, which incur inward capital movement through the sale of all or 
parts of Scandinavian firms to foreign investors. Outward cross-border M&As then incur 
outward capital movement through the purchase of all or parts of foreign firms. When a firm 
acquire more than 50% of the shares of the acquired firm, the M&A is called majority M&A. 
A minority M&A, on the other hand, is an M&A mode where a firm engage in an acquisition 
of a minority share-holding. Cross-border majority M&A is preferred to cross-border minority 
M&A as an entry mode into markets in developed countries, while cross-border minority 
M&A is preferred to cross-border majority M&A in developing countries. A possible 
explanation for the different entry modes across countries could be that it is easier to find 
appropriate firms to acquire in developed countries than in developing countries. In addition 
to the relative scarcity of appropriate target firms, more restrictions on take-overs may exist, 
particularly on majority take-overs, in developing countries (Kang & Johansson, 2000).  
 
2.2 Merger and acquisition waves 
 
The previous century experienced five waves of major merging activity: the 1890s, the 1920s, 
the 1960s, the 1980s and the 1990s, where the final wave is remarkable due to its breadth and 
geographic distribution. Europe had 117 000 M&A deals during the fifth wave, compared to 
only 13 000 during the fourth wave. The activity level abroad increased tremendously during 
the fifth wave, and a substantial takeover market emerged in Asia. The increase in cross-
border acquisitions in sectors such as finance and telecom was among other factors generated 
by the enhancement in privatization and deregulation (Gregoriou & Renneboog, 2007).  
Takeover waves are often driven by industrial and technological shocks, and is often fuelled 
by regulatory changes as seen during the fifth wave. While takeover activity is usually 
disrupted by a steep decline in the stock market, patterns show that takeovers increase in 
periods of economic recovery as was the case of the first wave in America during the 1890s. 
During this period, many giant companies were created as a result of the increased M&A 
activity, and public concern was raised due to the monopolization efforts that marked 
restructuring activity. As a consequence, the Antitrust Law was inducted in both Europe and 
the US (Gregoriou & Renneboog, 2007). The objective of the anti-trust policy was to break up 
dominant firms. As a reaction, firms expanded through vertical integration, where the 
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companies in a supply chain are united through a common owner, instead. Industries were 
now no longer dominated by one giant firm, but by two or more corporations. The effort of 
the corporations to achieve economies of scale was the characteristics of the second wave, and 
marked the difference from the first wave where the main objective of firms was to gain 
market power. The second wave collapsed in 1929 with the stock market crash and The Great 
Depression (Martynova & Renneboog, 2005).  
The third M&A wave started in the 1950s and lasted for almost two decades (Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2005). In a similar manner as the second wave, the third wave also collapsed due 
to an economic recession. The new takeover wave peaked in 1968, but collapsed during the 
oil crisis in 1973. The third wave was different in the UK and the US. While the former wave 
emphasized vertical integration, the third wave focused on diversification and development of 
large conglomerates since the anti-trust legislation left the acquiring firms in the US with the 
only option of buying companies outside their own industries. However, countries without a 
strict antitrust policy, such as France, Germany and Australia, did also pursue conglomerate 
strategies in hopes of enhancing company value and reducing earnings volatility (Andrade, 
Mitchell & Stafford, 2001).  
The stock market recovered from the preceding economic recession around the same time as 
the antitrust policy changed and the financial service sector was deregulated. In addition to 
technological progress in the electronics industry, these are factors which characterized the 
start of the fourth wave in 1981. The third wave’s inefficient unrelated diversifications made 
companies refocus on their core business. A shift in power of corporate stakeholders to 
shareholders during the period of the fourth wave was mainly a result of the enhancement of 
hostile takeovers (Martynova & Renneboog, 2005).  
Only four years after the fourth wave ended, the fifth takeover wave started in 1993. In 
similarity to the previous waves, the fifth wave ended as a consequence of the equity market 
collapse in 2000. A different feature of the fifth wave compared to previous waves was that a 
substantial part of the M&As were cross-border transactions. The proportion of diversification 
in M&A deals continued to decrease towards the end of the 20
th
 century (Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2005), along with the proportion of hostile takeovers which also decreased by a 
substantial amount from the fourth to the fifth takeover wave (Andrade et al., 2001).   
At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, a new M&A wave emerged. The latest merger wave 
started in 2003, about three years after the technology bubble burst (Alexandridis, Mavis & 
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Travlos, 2012). Literature on the sixth merger wave is still limited, but a remarkable feature of 
the recent merger wave is that market returns were significantly lower than market returns 
prior to deals in the fifth merger wave. A reason for this could be that there was less investor 
over-optimism during the last two merger waves. The last identifiable wave came to an end in 
late-2007 when investors and corporate managers started to show real signs of scepticism 
about the state of credit markets and its potential destroying effect on the financial system and 
the economy as a whole (Alexandridis et al., 2012).  
An interesting feature of the merger waves is that they are not similar even though they occur 
in readily identifiable waves over time. The level of merger activity in each industry has been 
seen to vary over time. Thus, industries where the level of merger activity is high in one 
decade are no more likely to exhibit a high level of merger activity in the next decade. This 
may indicate that a significant portion of merger activity may be due to industry-level shocks 
like technological innovations, supply shocks and deregulation (Andrade et al., 2001).   
  
2.3 Motives, risks and obstacles of M&A 
 
The traditional finance paradigm assumes that the behaviour of economic agents is fully 
rational. A consequence of this assumption is that M&A activity is purely motivated by 
economic reasons, and should therefore lead to measurable improvements in the post-M&A 
performance. However, empirical evidence shows that many M&As destroy shareholder 
value in the post-M&A period. Behavioral explanations of M&A replace the view that 
stakeholders in the M&A process act rationally in a frictionless environment with more 
relaxed behavioral assumptions (Baker & Kiymaz, 2011, p.385). 
 
2.3.1 Neoclassical theories 
 
The most common reason for firms to initiate M&A is the synergy argument claiming that the 
value of the post-merger firm is greater than the sum of the individual companies’ value 
before the merge. It is common to divide the main types of synergy into two categories: 
operating synergy and financial synergy (Gaughan, 2011, p.133).  
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Operating synergies can be achieved through revenue enhancements and cost reductions. 
Revenue-enhancing operating synergy may come from new opportunities that are made 
possible as a result of the combination of two merged companies. It may also be achieved if 
one company with a major brand name lends its reputation to an upcoming product line of the 
partner company it has merged with. Revenue-enhancing synergies are often more difficult to 
achieve than cost-related synergies since they are more difficult to quantify and build into 
valuation models (Gaughan, 2011, p.134).  
Cost-reducing synergies may come from economies of scale, which can be explained as 
reductions in per-unit costs due to an increase in the size or scale of a company’s production. 
The fixed costs of capital intensive firms are often spread out over relatively low levels of 
output. If these firms get the opportunity to increase output, the per-unit costs will decline. 
Cost-reducing synergies may also come from specialization of labour and management, and 
more efficient use of capital equipment, but this might not be possible at low output levels 
(Gaughan, 2011, p.135). The benefits of M&A includes the possibility of eliminating some 
fixed costs, reducing R&D and management expenditures, and cost reduction by 
rationalization of selling, marketing and advertisement department (Gurusamy, 2009). 
However, the merged firm may also experience diseconomies of scale, which is the case when 
per-unit costs increase, and might occur if the firm experiences problems associated with 
coordinating a larger-scale operation (Gaughan, 2011, p.135).  
Financial synergy refers to the possibility that the cost of capital may decrease when one or 
more companies are combined. Merging firms may reduce risk if the firms’ cash flow is not 
perfectly correlated such that the volatility of the cash flows decreases. Wide swings up and 
down in the combined firms’ cash flows will be less likely. The probability of bankruptcy will 
presumably be lower if the suppliers of capital consider the firm less risky. If one of the two 
merging firms had experienced conditions that would force it into bankruptcy in advance of 
the merge, creditors would presumably have suffered a loss. However, when the two firms are 
combined, the solvent firm would cushion the decline in the other firm’s cash flows.  The 
offsetting earnings of the solvent firm might be sufficient to prevent the combined firm from 
falling into bankruptcy, and thereby keep the creditors from suffering losses. This effect is 
often referred to as debt coinsurance. However, there are disagreements on whether the effect 
of debt coinsurance is more relevant for conglomerate acquisitions than for non-conglomerate 
acquisitions (Gaughan, 2011, p.143).  
 
 
13 
 
 
2.3.2 Behavorial theories 
 
Roll (1986) presents the Hubris hypothesis as an explanation on why acquisitions occur. 
According to the Hubris hypothesis, managers make mistakes when evaluating target firms, 
and the valuation above the current market price represents a positive valuation error. When 
the target firm shareholder conducts a valuation, it has a lower bound, the market price. No 
offer is made if the valuation is under the market price, because the bidder knows that the 
shareholder will not sell below this price. If the bidder believes that there are potential 
synergies or other sources of takeover gains, in a situation where there are no gains, the 
valuation of the target can be considered as a random variable whose mean is the target firm’s 
current market price. If the random variable does not exceed its mean, no offer is made. 
However, if the random variable does exceed its mean, an offer is made. Outcomes in the left 
tail of the distribution of valuations are never observed since offers only are observed when 
the valuation is too high. In this case, the takeover premium (tended offer or merger price less 
preannouncement market price of the target firm) is simply a random error, and thus a mistake 
made by the bidding firm. The observed error is always in the same direction because 
corresponding errors made in the opposite direction is not made public and will therefore not 
enter the empirical samples. Since market prices seem to reflect rational behaviour, firms 
should realize that any bid above the market price represents an error. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that market prices are averages, and that there is no evidence that 
indicates that every individual act is if they are rational economic human beings whose 
behaviour seems revealed by behaviour or market prices (Roll, 1986). 
According to the Hubris hypothesis, takeovers thus reflect individual decisions. 
Bidders/managers may convince themselves that their valuation is right and that the market 
does not reflect the full economic value of the combined firm. Even if gains do exist for some 
M&As, a part of the takeover premium could still be caused by valuation error (Roll, 1986). 
The hubris hypothesis is consistent with strong-form market efficiency, which implies that 
prices at any given time incorporate all information, whether public or private (Frankfurter & 
McGoun, 2002), and financial markets are thereby assumed to be efficient in that asset prices 
reflect all information about individual firms (Roll, 1986).  
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Jensen (1986) proposes free cash flow as another theory that opts to explain takeovers, and 
shows how takeovers can be evidence of the conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders. Acquiring another firm is a way for managers to spend cash instead of paying it 
out to shareholders. Payment of cash to shareholders reduces the power of managers by 
reducing resources controlled by managers. In addition, managers have incentives to expand 
their firms beyond the size that maximizes shareholders wealth, both because this will 
increase managers’ control and because changes in management compensation are positively 
correlated with growth. In accordance with the theory, managers of firms with unused 
borrowing power and large free cash flows (cash flow in excess of that required to fund all of 
a firm’s projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of 
capital) are more likely to undertake low-benefit or value-destroying mergers. In order to 
create shareholders’ value, free cash flows should rather be paid out as dividends to 
shareholders instead of undertaking low-benefit mergers (Jensen, 1986). 
In addition to bonuses and managerial salaries, stock options and promotions tend to be more 
closely related to the size or changes in size of the firm than its profits. The prestige and 
power managers derive from their occupation are also related to the size and growth of the 
company, and have a direct impact on the managers’ pursuit of growth. Based on this 
reasoning, the growth maximization hypothesis claims that managers maximize the size of 
their corporation rather than its profits or stockholder welfare. Thus, managers tend to accept 
a lower return from investing in the stock from another firm than the shareholders (Mueller, 
1969). 
While most empirical studies suggest that the announcement effect of M&A is positive for 
target shareholders, the effect on acquiring firms is not as clear (Goergen & Renneboog, 
2004). Moeller, Schlingemann and Stultz (2005) finds that announcement of M&A generate 
positive wealth effects for acquiring firms in the time span between 1991 and 1997, but that 
the losses of the acquiring firms the following four years were greater than all the gains made 
earlier. The wealth losses associated with the M&A announcement may be caused by 
overpayment by the management or because the transaction reveals that the management’s 
strategy is unsustainable (Moeller, Schlingemann & Stultz, 2005). Overvaluation of targets is 
often observed in acquisitions of privately held firms because of information asymmetry. If 
the target is a privately held firm, its assets and operations will be more difficult to value than 
if the target is public (Officer, Poulsen & Stegemoller, 2009). The negative announcement 
effect of M&A on acquiring shareholders’ wealth may also be explained by Jensen’s (1986) 
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free cash flow hypothesis described above. Managers realize large personal gains from empire 
building, and firms with abundant cash flows may therefore spend cash on acquiring firms 
instead of paying it out to shareholders. When there are few profitable investment 
opportunities, the managers are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions than to 
return the excess cash flows to shareholders (Masulis, Wang & Xie, 2007). 
 
 
2.3.3 Main obstacles of cross-border M&A 
 
Due to the large integration costs associated with cross-border M&A, national cultural 
distances often hinders cross-border acquisition performance. National cultural distances 
represent the differences in cultural norms between the target and the acquirer (Morosini, 
Shane & Singh, 1998). The challenges of cross-border M&A tend to be greater than those of 
domestic M&A due to the risks associated with different national cultures and institutional 
settings. Thorough examination of the target company and its host country is therefore 
necessary in order to acquire the right company (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
The examination of a target firm undertaken by the acquirer prior to the takeover and the 
process of understanding the true value and risk associated with the deal is called the due 
diligence process. This process may be more challenging in the case of a cross-border M&A 
than in domestic M&A because the information available to the acquirer is less extensive in 
cross-border deals. The due diligence process may be vital in order for the acquirer to choose 
the right target, and it is therefore important to learn as much as possible about the new 
environment where the firm plans to implement the acquisition. This means that the acquirer 
should analyse the political, economic, legal, tax and accounting systems in the target country 
before engaging in an acquisition (Shimizu et al., 2004).  
In addition to the challenges due to different political and legal systems, cross-border mergers 
and acquirers are also likely to face challenges due to differences in social and cultural norms, 
language barriers and history (Shimizu et al., 2004). A financial advisor is often engaged in 
the due diligence process in order to help identifying and/or structuring better M&As. 
Advisors thus identify potential targets, evaluate stand-alone and combined values, and 
propose methods for obtaining synergies (Kale, Kini & Ryan Jr. , 2003). 
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As well as cultural differences, organizational differences are also likely to be an obstacle for 
firms to achieve integration benefits. Since the organizational culture is highly influenced by 
the national culture, the risk of failure associated with cross-border M&A increases with 
growing cultural differences between the target and the acquirer (Harzing & Van Ruysseveldt, 
2004). According to Martynova and Renneboog (2008), differences in the quality of corporate 
governance standards between the bidder and the target countries may explain part of the 
expected value creation in cross-border M&As. Corporate governance can be explained as the 
system of laws, rules and factors that control operations at a firm (Gillan, 2006). 
In the case of a full takeover, the nationality of the target firm will change such that the 
acquirer’s corporate governance regulation will apply to the combined company. If a bidder is 
subject to better corporate governance regulation than the target, the take-over may result in 
an improvement in corporate governance at the target, and this is expected to generate 
additional value which will be reflected in the abnormal share price returns of both the bidder 
and the target. This hypothesis is known as the positive spillover by law hypothesis. The 
opposite is true if a bidder is subject to poorer corporate governance regulation than the target. 
The logic behind the negative spillover by law hypothesis is that if the bidder governance 
standards are below those of the target, the abnormal share price returns will be lower. There 
is however a possibility that the bidder will abide by the stricter regulation that the target is 
subject to, and they will thus voluntarily bootstrap their corporate governance regulation to a 
higher level. In this case, the bidder’s value may increase, and this will be reflected in the 
bidder share price at the announcement of the take-over. The logic behind the bootstrapping 
hypothesis is thus that bidders voluntarily bootstrap their corporate governance regulation to a 
higher level. The valuation effect of bootstrapping may be weaker in full take-overs where a 
majority stake of 100% is acquired and the target still remains listed on its national stock 
exchange, but it may appear in both full and partial take-overs. The positive spillover by law 
effect is to take place in take-overs which leads to a change in the target firm’s nationality, but 
a similar spillover effect may also be seen in partial take-overs. When the bidder’s standards 
are stricter than the target’s in a partial take-over, the bidder may still impose its own 
corporate governance standards on the target even though the target firm is not fully absorbed 
by the bidder. The spillover effect in partial takeovers is called the spillover by control 
hypothesis (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008).  
When engaging in M&A, the bidder is faced with different choices which can affect the 
combined firm’s performance. One of these choices concerns the method of payment. The 
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bidder can choose between using cash, stock or a mix as a method of payment. Cash offers 
generally require debt financing considering that most bidders have limited cash and liquid 
assets. The bidder must in this case make a choice of debt or equity financing. Debt financing 
often raises financial distress costs of issuing debt, while equity financing may involve 
corporate control concerns of issuing equity. The choice of method of payment can thus be 
strongly influenced by its debt capacity and existing leverage. The bidder will have incentives 
to select cash financing over stock financing if preserving control is important to the 
management. The target can gain tax benefits when stock is used as method of payment, while 
cash may be preferred to stock in order to sidestep the risk of becoming a minority 
shareholder in a bidder firm with concentrated ownership (Faccio & Masulis, 2005). When 
stocks are used as method of payment, the acquirer shares the risk of overvaluation with the 
target’s owner. When the target is difficult to value, empirical studies suggest that 
announcement returns to stock-swap acquirers are substantially higher than when cash is used 
as method of payment (Officer, Poulsen & Stegemoller, 2009). 
Cross-border M&A is not only associated with greater outlets in foreign markets, but also 
with fiercer rivalry from foreign competitors in their domestic markets. Even though the 
phenomenon of cross-border M&A gives new opportunities for countries’ domestic markets, 
it also imposes a threat on the domestic firms due to increased competition engendered by 
freer trade. Trade liberalization and cross-border M&A will thus force firms to adjust to a 
more competitive environment and the exit of foreign existing firms will increase (Bertrand & 
Zitouna, 2006). 
 
2.4 Cross-border M&A in Scandinavia 
 
There are several reasons that make cross-border M&A in Scandinavia interesting to 
investigate. Due to the increase in cross-border M&A in Scandinavia and the lack of research 
on the subject, a better understanding of the phenomenon is needed. Since cross-border 
M&As are subject to greater obstacles than domestic M&As, this thesis focus on take-overs 
where the acquirer is from a foreign country in order to investigate whether it is expected that 
the possible synergies that emerge from a cross-border M&A outweighs the obstacles.  
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According to data collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012), the majority of firms 
that acquire Scandinavian enterprises are located in Western Europe and the United States. 
Among the acquiring firms in Western Europe, it is evident that other Scandinavian firms are 
accountable for the highest share of cross-border take-overs in Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway. Swedish firms were for instance accountable for about 25% of all cross-border 
M&A in Norway and Denmark from 1997 to 2011
5
. US and Norwegian firms are almost 
equally large contributors to cross-border take-overs in Sweden, while US firms are the 
second largest contributor in both Denmark and Norway (Thomson Reuters Datastream, 
2012).  
By examining the history of cross-border M&A in Scandinavia the previous 15 years, it is 
evident that the phenomenon occurs more often in Sweden than in its two neighbouring 
countries. There were roughly twice as many cases of cross-border M&A in Sweden than in 
Norway in the time span between 1997 and 2011. While 887 Norwegian firms were subject to 
take-overs by foreign enterprises, there were 1596 cases of take-overs in Sweden (Thomson 
Reuters Datastream, 2012). However, since the Swedish population is almost twice as large as 
the Norwegian population (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2012 & Statistiska Centralbyrån, 2012), it 
will make more sense to consider numbers of M&A relative to the population in each of the 
countries when examining the occurrence of cross-border M&A in Scandinavia. By this 
measure, completed cross-border M&A deals seemed to occur almost equally as often in the 
three neighbouring countries during the period. In comparison to cross-border M&A in 
Sweden and Norway, 942 Danish firms were subject to take-overs by foreign enterprises 
during the same time span (Thomson Reuters Datastream, 2012).  
 
                                                          
5
 See appendix B for an overview of acquiring firms by nationality 
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Figure 1: Cross-border M&A in Scandinavia in the time span during 1997 and 2011 
Source: own illustration using data collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012), Statistiska 
Centralbyrån (2012), Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2012) and Danmarks Statistik (2012) 
 
The time span under which international take-overs are examined in this thesis shows that 
there have been peaks and lows in cross-border M&A in Scandinavia which has been driven 
by underlying economic factors. The stock market crash in 2000 which ended the fifth take-
over wave (Martynova & Renneboog, 2005), did also affect cross-border M&A in 
Scandinavia, and was the reason behind the sharp decrease in number of take-overs during 
2000-2002, which is seen in the graph above. A strong global growth, which contributed to a 
commodity price boom, was later witnessed in the timespan between 2003 and early 2008 
(The World Bank, 2009). In similarity to earlier take-over waves, cross-border M&A in 
Scandinavia increased during this period of economic recovery. Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2009) reports that new lending for restructuring, such as M&A and share purchases, fell by 
60% in USA during the peak period of the financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008 
relative to the prior quarter. The witnessed decrease in lending for restructuring during the 
financial crisis could be a result of the decreased demand for loan, the concentration in loan 
supply, or both (Ivashina & Scharfsein, 2009).  
In similarity to bank loans, intra-company loans did also dwindle in the time of the crisis 
(Poulsen & Hufbauer, 2011). Firms affected by the global liquidity crisis were thus 
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experiencing limited access to financial resources which constrained the purchasing abilities 
of acquiring firms and resulted in a sharp decrease in M&A activity (Calderon & Didier, 
2009). The capacity of firms to invest therefore weakened considerably during the financial 
crisis which started in the end of 2008. In addition, the crisis probably fostered a more 
cautious attitude among managers which may have resulted in a move away from high-risk 
projects to safer assets. Given that the crisis started in Western countries and that economic 
growth is one of the main drivers behind foreign direct investment and M&A, it is not 
difficult to see why cross-border deals of developed-country companies have declined the 
most. The dive in cross-border M&A deals of companies in Western countries has led to a 
major drop in cross-border M&A worldwide, and 2009 was the year when the foreign direct 
investment recession reflected in M&As became truly global in character (Poulsen & 
Hufbauer, 2011).  
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3 Literature review 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have increased tremendously over the last decade, but 
research on the area has failed to keep in pace with this trend. Even though the literature on 
the subject is extensive, there are still many gaps that need to be addressed (Shimizu et al., 
2004). The majority of literature on M&A is related to domestic M&A. A reason for this is 
probably that M&As involving firms from the same country has been the most common form 
for mergers and acquisition. However, as globalization of business has increased, the 
opportunities for engaging in cross-border M&A have heightened. A better understanding of 
the opportunities and challenges of firms engaging in cross-border M&A is thus needed 
because of their growing importance in the global market (Shimizu et al., 2004). In addition to 
the fact that most studies concentrate on M&A in one single country, it is also evident that 
most studies concentrate on the US and UK markets (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004).  
 
Mulherin and Boon (2000) are the authors of one of many research papers on abnormal 
announcement returns in USA. Their findings are similar to other researchers on the area, and 
show that shareholders of target firms receive large premiums relative to the 
preannouncement share price. The effect of M&A announcements on the wealth of the 
bidding firms are on the other hand not as clear (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004). Walker 
(2000) mentions empirical studies that indicate that M&A announcements have little impact 
on the stock prices of the acquiring firm. His own study examines the abnormal return of 278 
completed acquisitions over five days between 1980 and 1996, and finds that bidder 
shareholders generally earn normal cumulative market-adjusted return following related 
acquisitions and negative cumulative market-adjusted return following unrelated acquisitions. 
However, about half of the existing studies on the subjects report zero or small returns for the 
acquirers in USA (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004).  
 
Cheng and Chan (1995) examines 70 US targets of international takeovers from 13 countries, 
and find that US target firms earn positive abnormal returns after being acquired by a firm 
from a foreign country when investigating stock prices of the target firm over three days 
surrounding the announcement date. The study exhibit the same results as the study by Harris 
and Ravenscraft (1991), which also reports positive abnormal returns for US target firms 
following a cross-border acquisition after studying 159 cross-border acquisitions in USA 
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between 1970 and 1987.  The effect of cross-border M&A and domestic M&A on target 
shareholders wealth in USA is thus the same according to the studies revised. In addition to 
prove positive abnormal returns for US target firms in the period surrounding the 
announcement day,  Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) also find that target wealth gains are 
significantly higher in cross-border takeovers than in domestic takeovers. The evidence for 
the UK is however weaker, a result which indicates that the location of the target appears to 
have a significant impact on cross-border acquisitions effect. The same result is true for UK 
bidder abnormal returns. However, the study shows that UK targets in cross-border 
acquisitions yield positive abnormal return, which is consistent with the result for the US 
target firms in cross-border acquisitions. Exchange rate movements may give foreign bidders 
a cost of capital advantage, and there is therefore a possibility that exchange rates have an 
impact on the level of abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions (Danbolt & Maciver, 
2012). Even though most empirical evidence suggest that the announcement effect of M&A is 
positive for target shareholders, Loughran and Vijh (1997) finds that target shareholders who 
doesn’t sell out soon after the acquisition effective date when stock is received as payment, 
but rather hold on to the acquirer’s stock, find their gains diminish over time.  
 
A difficulty with the event study methodology, which is most commonly used in order to 
detect abnormal returns in the events of M&A, is the disagreement on which asset pricing 
model is to be used. The choice of model may have an important impact on the scale of 
abnormal returns. However, many studies that use different types of models come to the same 
conclusion that takeovers are wealth reducing events for acquiring companies. When studying 
returns in hostile bids, however, the result showing negative returns is not significant in all 
models (Gregory, 1997). Gregory (1997) also finds that over-payment is more likely in agreed 
bids, which may be a reason of why recommended offers have the worst performance over the 
24 months studied after the acquisition. Agreed bids are thus less successful than hostile bids. 
In addition to these results, acquisitions by multiple acquirers were proven to be less 
unsuccessful than those by a single acquirer.  
 
While the majority of existing research on the announcement effect of M&A focuses on gains 
or losses to shareholders in the short run, a smaller body of research examines long-run post-
acquisition returns (Dutta & Jog, 2009). Martynova and Renneboog (2008) finds that the 
magnitude of the M&A effect on the share prices strongly depends on the estimation method 
used when examining long-term wealth effects. Studies employing the market model tend to 
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reveal significantly negative abnormal returns over the three years following the 
announcement of M&A, while studies applying other estimation techniques, such as the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), yield inconsistent results about the cumulative average 
abnormal return in the long run. However, the long-term abnormal returns become significant 
when the M&A transactions are partitioned into subsamples like method of payment and bid 
status, such as hostile and friendly bids. When M&As are fully financed by equity, empirical 
evidence suggests that M&As yield significantly negative long-term returns. All-cash bids 
are, on the other hand, followed by positive returns. Evidence from the UK shows that hostile 
bids significantly outperform friendly ones over a three years window after the announcement 
of the bid (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Studies on the long-term gains of related and 
unrelated acquisitions do however differ in their conclusion on the long-term effect of M&A 
on shareholders’ value. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) mentions two different studies on 
the subject by Haugen and Undell (1972), and Eckbo (1986) which differ in their concluding 
remarks on the long-term gains of related and unrelated acquisitions. Haugen and Undell 
(1972) study a sample of 168 M&As during 13 years, and find evidence that both related and 
unrelated acquisitions lead to significantly positive abnormal returns over a four-year period, 
while Eckbo (1986) finds that unrelated takeovers outperform the ones triggered by industry-
related bids when studying the valuation effect of M&A in Canada. 
 
As for UK and US target shareholders, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) show that the 
announcement of a takeover bid also causes substantial positive abnormal returns for the 
shareholder of European target firms. The study analyses the effect of the announcement of 
cross-border M&A over a period starting six months prior to the announcement, and includes 
intra-European deals from 1993-2000. On the event day itself, it is shown an abnormal return 
of 9% for the target shareholders. However, when studying the two months prior to the 
announcement including the announcement day, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find that the 
cumulated abnormal returns amount up to 23%. This striking result suggests that bids were 
anticipated which is probably due to rumours or insider trading. Abnormal returns to bidder 
shareholders are also significantly positive, but small. However, the positive cumulative 
abnormal returns to bidder shareholders are only statistically significant when analysing the 
five days surrounding the announcement day, but this is not the case when longer periods are 
being analysed. In addition, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) have also analysed market 
reactions to different types of takeovers, and finds that hostile bids generate the largest 
abnormal return for targets on the announcement day.   
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Martynova and Renneboog (2008) examines European cross-border M&As during the fifth 
takeover wave (1993-2001), and their findings suggest that corporate governance regulation 
has a significant impact on the flow of cross-border take-overs. Their evidence also suggests 
that firms from countries with weak corporate governance regulation are more likely to 
engage in M&A abroad rather than domestically. In line with Goergen and Renneboog’s 
findings, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) also find evidence that target returns are 
significantly higher in hostile take-overs than in friendly take-overs, and that the same is true 
for full take-overs compared to partial take-overs. Target returns are, on the other hand, 
significantly lower when corruption in the target country is high. In addition, empirical 
evidence from Martynova and Renneboog (2008) suggests that the positive spillover by law 
hypothesis
6
 is supported. The effect of M&A announcement on abnormal share price return of 
the bidder and target will thus be positive when the bidder governance standards are stricter 
than the target’s. The empirical evidence does however not support the negative spillover by 
law hypothesis. On the other hand, evidence does not contradict the bootstrapping hypothesis 
or the spillover by control hypothesis. These effects are however only valid for partial take-
overs (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
6
 See section 2.3.3 for the logic behind the hypotheses 
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4 Data description 
 
This thesis uses data collected from Bureau Van Dijk’s database Zephyr in order to draw a 
sample of Scandinavian firms that has been subject to an acquisition or a merger in the time 
span between 1997 and 2011. Zephyr is the most comprehensive database of deal information 
and is updated hourly. The database contains information on M&A, IPO (Initial Public 
Offering), private equity and venture capital deals and rumours. It is possible to search by 
hundreds of criteria, for instance deal type, sub type, target industry and location of target 
firm, which is a necessity in order to look at the effect of cross-border M&A on value creation 
to target shareholders in Scandinavia.  
It was first and foremost important to select what kind of transactions this thesis is 
concentrating on, namely cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The next data selection was 
based on geography. Since the aim of the thesis has been to look at cross-border M&A in 
Scandinavia, the selection was restricted to only include Scandinavian target firms taken over 
by foreign acquirers. Further restriction was taken to only concern acquisitions of 
Scandinavian firms in the timespan between 01.01.1997 and 31.12.2011, thus a total of 15 
years. Firms lacking information about ISIN (International Securities Identification Number) 
were excluded from the sample. Another characteristic of the deals included in the sample is 
that they had to be completed. Deals that were only announced, but not completed were 
excluded from the sample. The M&As which are analysed in this thesis are majority M&As, 
i.e. acquisitions where the acquiring firm acquire more than 50% of the shares of the target 
firm. Firms that were acquired or announced to be acquired multiple times during the study 
period were also excluded from the sample. This was done because one announcement of 
M&A may affect the abnormal return in the event window of another announcement, in the 
case that the first announcement is made during the estimation period of the second 
announcement. One of the acquisitions in the sample was announced during a day when the 
stock market was closed. As a solution to missing return of data due to non-trading, proposed 
by Peterson (1989), the announcement day has therefore been chosen to be the following day 
when the stock market was open. After excluding the firms which lacked the necessary 
characteristics described above, 98 Scandinavian target firms were left in the sample. 
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Year Number of cross-border M&A 
1997 1 
1998 2 
1999 10 
2000 15 
2001 7 
2002 5 
2003 5 
2004 4 
2005 7 
2006 4 
2007 8 
2008 13 
2009 7 
2010 7 
2011 3 
Total 98 
 
Table 1: Number of cross-border M&As with Scandinavian firms as targets in the sample 
Source: Own illustration 
 
In order to retrieve abnormal returns of the stocks analysed, it was necessary to get 
information on return indices for target firms and the Scandinavian markets. The collection of 
daily data has been necessary in order to study security price reactions in the period 
surrounding the announcement day. Information on daily return indices for each target firm 
and each of the Scandinavian countries was collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
Thomson Reuters Datastream is a database containing financial information of firms and 
markets in addition to macroeconomic data from the Organization of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Inspired by 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008), the MSCI index is used to collect return indices of the 
Scandinavian markets. In order to achieve return indices related to the target firms in the 
sample, it was necessary to obtain the target firms ISIN from Zephyr.  
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5 The econometric methodology 
 
The effect of cross-border M&A activity in this thesis is evaluated on the basis of the 
shareholders’ value approach which compares shareholders’ value, measured by stock returns, 
subsequent to the announcement of cross-border M&A to an estimated value that is calculated 
based on the assumption that the M&A had not occurred (Wübben, 2007, p.13). While the 
majority of existing research on the announcement effect of M&A provide empirical evidence 
that announcement of domestic M&A increase target shareholders value, this thesis study the 
announcement effect of cross-border M&A in Scandinavia. The announcement effect of 
cross-border M&A in Scandinavia is examined by comparing stock returns of Scandinavian 
target firms in the period surrounding the announcement of cross-border M&A to a period 
when no event occurs in order to give support to the view that the announcement of cross-
border M&A enhances target shareholders’ value. 
The difference between the expected return when no event occur and the observed return 
when a merger or an acquisition is announced is fruitful to investigate since it represents an 
estimate of the expected value generated by the transaction. Due to the fact that cross-border 
M&As are subject to greater obstacles than other transactions
7
, the probability that cross-
border mergers or acquisitions actually will be completed as announced decreases compared 
to other transactions, and the expected discounted value of cross-border M&As will be 
reduced (Campa & Hernando, 2004). It is therefore interesting to examine whether the 
announcement of cross-border M&A succeed in creating value for the target shareholders. As 
previously mentioned, enhanced value for shareholders is an incentive for firms to engage in 
cross-border M&A. Empirical evidence that support the view that cross-border M&A 
increases target shareholders’ value can be helpful for firms in deciding whether or not to 
engage in cross-border M&A. 
There are various methods in order to measure M&A profitability. These include event 
studies, accounting studies, surveys of executives and clinical studies. While event studies 
examine the abnormal return to shareholders in the period surrounding the announcement date 
of the M&A, accounting studies examine the reported financial results of targets and acquirers 
in order to see if there are any differences in the results after an acquisition. The objective of 
surveys of executives is to ask managers whether or not the acquisition has created value in 
                                                          
7
 See section 2.3.3 
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order to measure the profitability of M&A. Clinical studies, however, focus on one 
transaction or a small sample in great depth (Bruner, 2002). In order to measure the value 
generated to target shareholders in Scandinavia by the announcement of cross-border M&A, 
this thesis will use event studies. The goal of an event study is to see whether a particular 
event influences some outcome (Wooldridge, 2009, p.355). Event studies are normally used 
to assess the economic impact of a given event, and often utilise financial market data in order 
to measure the impact of a special event on the value of the firm. The method is widely used 
when studying the effect of the announcement of M&A on shareholders’ value. The 
usefulness of an event study comes from the fact that, given rationality in the market, the 
effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices (MacKinley, 1997). This 
approach will typically not say anything about the impact of M&A on other stakeholders like 
employees, customers, management and the society, which are other potential perspectives for 
evaluating M&A success (Wübben, 2007, p.12).  
 
5.1 Event Study Framework 
 
The objective of the event study applied in this thesis is to investigate whether there are any 
abnormal returns earned by security holders accompanying specific events, where an 
abnormal return is the difference between the observed return of a security and the expected 
return of the security (Peterson, 1989). Due to the fact that the effects of an event immediately 
will be reflected in security prices, the economic impact of an event can be constructed using 
security prices observed over a relatively short time period (MacKinlay, 1997). When starting 
an event study, the first task is to define the event of interest. The event this thesis will 
measure the effect of is the announcement of cross-border M&As, and more precisely 
acquisitions of enterprises in Scandinavia. The next task is to select the sample set of firms to 
include in the analysis. The third step is to identify the event and estimation window. The 
event window will in this case be the period over which the security prices of the acquired 
firms in Scandinavia will be examined. In most cases, the event window is defined to be 
larger than the specific period of interest, so that one is able to examine the periods 
surrounding the event. Finally, abnormal returns within the event window will be calculated. 
It is also sufficient to test whether the abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. 
MacKinley (1997) reports, that in many cases, the market may acquire information of the 
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event prior to the announcement day. This possibility can be examined by pre-event returns, 
and makes the period prior to the announcement day interesting to investigate.  
Both statistical and economic models can be used in order to calculate the expected return of a 
given security. Economic models rely on assumptions concerning investors’ behaviour and 
are not based solely on statistical assumptions. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and 
the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) are two common economic models which add restrictions 
to the statistical models in order to provide more constrained normal return models. In the 
CAPM, which was a commonly used model in event studies during the 1970s, the expected 
return of a given security is determined by its covariance with the market portfolio 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The CAPM requires a measure of the risk-free return in order to estimate 
the normal return, which can be an obstacle when implementing event studies to measure the 
effect of M&A in developing economies due to the underdeveloped government-issued 
securities markets (Ma, Pagán & Chu, 2009). In addition, the possibility that the results of 
studies may be sensitive to restrictions imposed by the CAPM has been discovered, and the 
use of the CAPM has become less common (MacKinlay, 1997). The Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
is a multifactor model which shows that if all securities’ returns are affected by the common 
factors, expected returns are a function of the risk in the model (Binder, 1998). The expected 
return of a given security will thus be a linear combination of multiple factors. There is a 
potential gain from using the APT over the CAPM because the biases introduced by using the 
latter will be eliminated. However, the gains from using APT over the market model, which 
will be explained below, are small since the most important factor in the Arbitrage Pricing 
Model behaves like a market factor and the additional factors add relatively little explanatory 
power (MacKinlay, 1997). 
MacKinlay(1997) states that statistical models seem to dominate in event studies because of 
their improvement over the economic models. Among the statistical models are the constant 
mean return model and the market model, which are the most common choices (MacKinlay, 
1997). The constant mean return model is used to calculate mean-adjusted returns by 
subtracting the average return for stock i during the estimation period from the stock’s return 
during the event period. The method used to calculate mean-adjusted returns does not 
explicitly control for the risk of the stock or the return on the market portfolio during the 
event period. The abnormal return estimators will have considerably greater variances in the 
constant mean return model than the market model disturbances (Binder, 1998). Since the 
market model represents a potential improvement over the constant mean return model, the 
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market model is chosen in order to calculate expected return in this thesis. The improvement 
from using the market model thus comes from the fact that the portion of return which is 
related to variation in the market’s return is removed. This will reduce the variance of the 
abnormal return, and can lead to increased ability to detect event effects. The market model 
relates the return of a given security to the return of the market portfolio (MacKinlay, 1997).  
 
5.2 Assumptions of the Event Study Methodology 
 
The most important assumption of the event study methodology is that it presumes market 
efficiency (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). An efficient market in the market efficiency 
hypothesis is a market in which security prices at any time fully reflect all available 
information. This extreme version of the hypothesis presumes that information and trading 
costs are always zero. Since there are certainly positive information and trading costs, this 
strong version of the market efficiency hypothesis is surely false. A weaker version of the 
hypothesis says that prices reflect information to the point where marginal benefits of acting 
on information do not exceed the marginal costs (Fama, 1970).  
The market efficiency hypothesis rules out arbitrage opportunities. This is more easily 
explained by Jensen’s (1978, p.3) general way to express the hypothesis: ‘’A market is 
efficient with respect to information set θt if it is impossible to make economic profits by 
trading on the basis of information set θt’’. The efficient market hypothesis can be divided 
into three categories; the weak form, the semi-strong form and the strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis (Jensen, 1978).  
The differences of the three categories of the efficient market hypothesis mainly revolve 
around the definition of the information set θt. In the weak form of the efficient market 
hypothesis, the information set θt is taken to be solely the information contained in the past 
price history of the markets as of time t, while in the semi-strong form, θt is taken to be all 
information that is publicly available, including the past history of prices, at time t (Jensen, 
1978). The semi-strong form of the hypothesis thus implies that prices at any given time 
incorporate all publicly available information. The weak form of the efficient market 
hypothesis implies that stock prices follow a random walk since prices only respond to new 
information which arrives randomly, and that one cannot earn superior returns by taking 
 
 
31 
 
advantage of historical price movements (Frankfurter & McGoun, 2002). In the last version of 
the hypothesis, the strong form of the market efficiency hypothesis, θt is taken to be all 
information known to anyone at time t (Jensen, 1978). The strong form then implies that 
prices at any given time incorporate all information, whether public or private (Frankfurter & 
McGoun, 2002). Event studies are being used under the semi-strong form of the market 
efficiency hypothesis, which implies that prices should reflect all publicly available 
information, in order to examine the impact of some event on the wealth of the firm’s security 
holders (Binder, 1998). The inference of significance of the results obtained from the event 
study methodology thus relies on the assumption that markets are efficient. In addition to the 
assumption of market efficiency, the event study methodology also relies on the assumptions 
that the event was unforeseen and that there were no cofounding effects during the event 
period under which the abnormal returns are being examined. The last assumption is critical 
because if other financially relevant events are occurring during the event period, it is difficult 
to isolate the impact of one particular event (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
The assumptions of the event study methodology can thus be listed as follows: 
1) markets are efficient 
2) the event was unanticipated 
3) there were no cofounding effects during the event period  
 
 
5.3 Determination of event and estimation Windows 
 
The returns of a stock that are expected to be observed if no event occurs are called expected 
or normal returns (Peterson, 1989). The return of a share is to some extent correlated with the 
return of the stock market which it is a part of, and the expected return of a share over a 
period is therefore the return on the market over that period. Research on the effect of M&A 
on shareholders’ value therefore needs an estimate of expected or normal returns for shares 
over some period of interest (Armitage, 2006). Normal returns are generally estimated over a 
time period other than the time period surrounding the event date. This time period is called 
the estimation window (Peterson, 1989). 
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Selection of the length of the event and estimation periods is left to the researcher, and is 
often chosen on the basis of previous studies (Peterson, 1989). After having defined the event 
of interest, which in this thesis will be acquisitions of Scandinavian target firms, the next task 
is to identify the period over which the security prices of the firms involved in this event will 
be examined; the event window (MacKinlay, 1997). The dissemination of news about a 
merger or an acquisition may extend over more than one day. The corporation may release the 
news one day, but it may not be reported by the financial press until the day after. It is thus 
unclear when the information reaches the market since the market participants may not have 
the information during market trading hours the day the corporation makes the announcement 
(Peterson, 1989).  
In a perfectly efficient market, the event window could be restrained to only include the day 
of announcement, but in order to capture market reactions of announcements when it is 
unclear if the market has received the information during trading hours or if it is available 
only after the stock market has closed, the event window is thus extended to couple of days. 
In addition, there is always a possibility of information leakage prior to the announcement day 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The use of a very long event window implies that the researcher do not 
believe that the effect of an event is quickly incorporated into the stock price. This can be 
interpreted as a violation of the first assumption of the event study methodology, namely the 
assumption of market efficiency. The use of a long event window may also imply that the 
researcher believes that the event was anticipated, which violates assumption two explained 
above. In addition, the risk of experiencing cofounding events during the event window 
increases with the length of the event window. If cofounding events are experienced during 
the estimation window, the third assumption of the event study methodology will be violated 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). The event window is typically of the same length for each 
stock, but over different calendar dates (Armitage, 2006).  
Since this thesis looks at the effect of cross-border M&A on the short-term performance, an 
event window of five days will be chosen for each of the 98 stocks analysed, spanning from 
two days prior to the announcement day to two days after the announcement day. This choice 
is motivated by the length of the event window used in a short-term study by Walker (2000). 
By including two days before and after the announcement day in the event window, it is 
possible to capture market reactions in situations when the timing of dissemination of news is 
unclear. An advantage of studying the effect of cross-border M&A on the short-term 
performance comes from the fact that it is not necessary to control for the size of the firm. In 
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any study of long term effects, however, size effects will be of importance (Gregory, 1997). In 
addition, there will be no information other than the news of the merger or acquisition in the 
short run. The observed returns during the event period are therefore entirely due to this news. 
Since the method of payment has no impact on total short-run changes in value, it is not 
necessary to evaluate the effect of different methods of payment in the short run (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 2003).  
While studies argue about the proper length of estimation window, most agree that the 
standard estimation period should be between 100 and 300 trading days. Inspired by Corrado 
(2011), who argues that a value of 250 days should be chosen to approximately correspond to 
the number of trading days during a calendar year, 250 days will be chosen as the length of 
the estimation window in this thesis. 
Inspired by MacKinlay (1997), the event date is defined as t = 0, and t= T0+1 to t = T1 
constitutes the estimation window, while t = T1 + 1 to t = T2 represents the event window in 
order for the estimation window and the event window not to overlap. This will provide 
estimators for the parameters of the normal return model which are not influenced by the 
returns around announcement days of acquisition. If the event and estimation windows were 
to overlap, this could lead to a situation where both the normal returns and the abnormal 
returns would capture the effect of the M&A announcement (MacKinlay, 1997). 
The timing sequence can be illustrated by a timeline as in Figure 2, consistent with 
MacKinlay (1997), where the event day (day of announcement) is 0, the estimation window 
and event window are depicted by (T1-T0) and (T2-T1) respectively:  
 
 
                                Estimation window              Event window 
    
     
                                T0                                              T1                0             T2 
                                                                                                                                               t 
                                                                                                                                                  
 Figure 2: Timeline, source: MacKinlay (1997) 
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The estimation window from T0 +1= -252 to T1 = -3 will thus include the 250 days 
immediately prior to the start of the event window, which is spanning from two days prior to 
the announcement day to two days after the announcement day, thus from 
(T1 + 1) = -2 to T2 = 2.           
 
5.4 Calculation of abnormal returns 
 
In order to find the effect of acquisition on target shareholders’ value, a measure of the 
abnormal return is required. The abnormal return can be defined as the difference between the 
actual ex post return of the security over the event window, and the expected return, without 
conditioning on the event taking place, of the firm over the event window (MacKinlay, 1997). 
The expected return is thus the normal return which would have been expected if the firm had 
not been acquired. For firm i at time t, the abnormal return is 
 
                                 ARi,t = ri,t  - E(ri,t)              (1) 
where ARi,t , ri,t and E(ri,t) are the abnormal, actual and expected returns for a given stock at 
time t respectively. 
By applying ordinary least squares (OLS), the relationship between the return of the security 
and the return of the market can be estimated:  
 
                        ri,t = αi + βi rm,t + εi,t , t = -252,…, -3            (2) 
where ri,t is the return of security i at time t, and rm,t is the return of the benchmark market 
index at time t. εi,t is the zero mean disturbance team, while αi and  βi are the parameters of 
the market model to be estimated (MacKinlay, 1997).  
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Ordinary least squares (OLS) is a consistent estimation procedure for the market model under 
the Gauss-Markov Assumptions for Simple Regression, which state that the model is linear in 
parameters, that we have a random sample of size n, that the sample outcomes on r are not all 
the same value, and that the error ε has an expected value of zero given any value of the 
explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2009, p.47). The OLS estimators of the parameters in the 
market model are consistent with MacKinlay (1997), and are as follows: 
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where L1 = T1 – T0 is the length of the estimation window as depicted in figure 2 in the 
previous section. 
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Since the return in Datastream is expressed as an index, where the base date of the company is 
100 and the return evolves each day from here on, the actual return of security i will be 
defined as the logarithm of the change in return indices (RI) on day t and day t-1 of security i: 
 
                                        ri,t = ln (Ri,t / Ri,t-1)    (8) 
 
The market return will be calculated over the chosen estimation period as the logarithm of the 
change in market return indices (MRI) on day t and day t-1: 
 
                                        rm,t = ln (MRIt / MRIt-1)             (9) 
 
The return indices for the stocks as well as the Scandinavian markets have been collected 
from Datastream. The calculation of the actual return of the securities and market returns are 
inspired by Gopikrishnan, Plerou, Amaral, Meyer and Stanley (1999), who calculates the 
return for a time series of prices or market index values over a time scale as the forward 
change in logarithm of the time series.  
The market model which is applied in this thesis follows the framework of MacKinlay (1997), 
and will be described further below. 
The abnormal returns will be the residuals from the regression of the OLS estimation, and is 
thus the difference between the observed return and the expected predicted return for stock i 
at time t: 
 
                         ̂ i,t= ri,t  - (α̂i + β̂irm,t) = εi,t , t= -2,…,2           (10) 
 
A value of the error term which is significantly different from zero represents an excess return 
earned by the shareholders of the firm (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
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In order to capture the total effect of the stock-movements during the period when the market 
might respond to news about M&A, the abnormal return observations must be aggregated 
over the period of the event window. The abnormal return observations can be aggregated 
both through time and across securities. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a given 
stock is first calculated over time in order to accommodate a multiple period event window: 
 
                                          ̂   ,     = ∑   ̂
 
    i,t           (11) 
 
Sample aggregated abnormal returns for period t (average abnormal return), where N is the 
number of acquisition announcements, will then be:  
 
 
 
                                            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =  
 
 
∑   ̂    i,t            (12) 
 
 
For a large estimation window, its variance will be 
 
                                                    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =  
 
  
∑    
  
               (13) 
 
Cumulative average abnormal return through time and across securities can be found by 
aggregating average abnormal return for period t:  
 
                                    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    ,    =  ∑   ̅̅ ̅̅
 
    t            (14) 
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The cumulative average abnormal return can be calculated for any interval in the event 
window (MacKinlay, 1997). If preferable, this makes it possible to compare the cumulative 
average abnormal return on intervals before and after the announcement day.   
The variance of the cumulative average abnormal return is 
 
                                ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    ,     =  ∑       ̅̅ ̅̅
 
    t)           (15) 
 
or alternatively 
 
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    ,     =  
 
  
∑   
  
      ,    )           (16) 
 
where 
  
    ,    = (t2     t1 + 1)  ̂  
2
           (17) 
 
5.5 Test statistics 
 
The null-hypothesis being tested is stated as: 
H0: Cross-border M&A announcements have a negative or no effect on the abnormal returns 
for target firm shareholders in Scandinavia in the short term 
while the alternate hypothesis is stated as: 
H1: Cross-border M&A announcements have a positive effect on the abnormal returns for 
target firm shareholders in Scandinavia in the short term. 
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In order to test the null hypothesis, inferences about the cumulative average abnormal returns 
can be drawn using 
 
                                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (t1,t2) ~ N[0, var(   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (t1,t2))]           (18) 
 
The sample variance measure of    
  from the market model regression in the estimation 
window is chosen as an estimator to calculate the variance of the abnormal returns 
(MacKinlay, 1997). 
  
In order to reach the conclusion on whether the cumulative abnormal returns are significantly 
different from zero on each of the days during the event period, this thesis uses both 
parametric and non-parametric tests. Parametric tests were the first tests to gain wide use in 
the development of modern techniques of statistical inference. A characteristic of the 
parametric tests are that they make assumptions about the nature of the population from which 
the observations are drawn (Siegel, 1957).  
The parametric test statistics proposed by MacKinlay (1997) in order to test whether the 
cumulative average abnormal returns are significantly different from zero in the period 
surrounding the event date, is  
 
                            = 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    ,   
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    ,       
 ~ N(0,1)           (19) 
 
The test statistic is distributed asymptotically normally with mean equal 0 and standard 
deviation equal 1. The statistical tests used to detect abnormal stock returns require the use of 
the standard error of the estimate from the regression analysis using estimation period returns 
(Peterson, 1989). The standard error for this test is therefore computed from the time-series of 
portfolio average abnormal returns during the estimation period, and avoids the potential 
problem of cross-sectional correlation of security returns (Fadl, 2011). 
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In addition to a parametric testing procedure, many event studies also use non-parametric tests 
to offer confirmation of the results (Armitage, 2006). Non-parametric tests do not make 
stringent assumptions about the population, and can also be used with non-numerical data 
(Siegel, 1957). Non-parametric tests are thus often provided in addition to the parametric tests 
of the abnormal returns because the assumption of normally distributed security returns may 
not be correct (Peterson, 1989).   
According to MacKinlay (1997), the basic of the sign test, which is used as the non-
parametric test in this thesis, is that under the null hypothesis, it is equally probable that the 
abnormal returns will be positive or negative. The sign test is used to support the findings of 
the parametric tests, but it is important to keep in mind that the sign test may not be well 
specified if the distribution of abnormal returns is skewed, which the case is for the 
distribution of abnormal returns on some of the days in the event period (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Following the null hypothesis above that there is a negative or no abnormal return associated 
with an announcement of cross-border M&A, the null hypothesis under the sign test is 
H0: p ≤ 0,5 
where p is the probability that the abnormal return is positive. The alternate hypothesis under 
the sign test is then  
H1: p > 0,5 
The test statistic used for each of the five days in the event period follows the framework of 
MacKinlay (1997), and is as follows 
 
                              = (
  
 
  ,5)  
√ 
 , 
     ,                 (20) 
 
where N is the total number of cases, and N
+
 is the number of cases where the abnormal 
return is positive. 
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6 Empirical evidence 
 
This thesis investigates whether the announcement of cross-border M&A generates value to 
the shareholders of target firms in Scandinavia by examining the effect of the event on stock 
prices. The event study methodology used in the thesis has made it possible to remove general 
stock price movements in order to separate out the effect of the event.
8
 
The assumptions of the Event Study Methodology applied in this thesis are the basis for the 
results presented in this chapter. The empirical findings in this thesis suggest that an average 
abnormal return of 12.01% is realized on the announcement day
9
. The result is significantly 
different from zero at a 1% significance level. The findings of this thesis therefore suggest 
that the main effect of cross-border M&A announcements on target firm shareholders value is 
positive.  
The findings also suggest a significant positive effect of the event on stock prices one and two 
days prior to the announcement day, even though the effect is less significant than what has 
been observed on the actual day of announcement. Two days prior to the announcement day, 
target firms experience a gain of 1.18%, while they experience a smaller gain of 0.96% on the 
day prior to the announcement day. The t-test shows that the results are significantly different 
from zero at a 1% significance level. The positive effect on the days in the event window 
prior to the announcement day may have been observed because the market had acquired 
information of the event before some of the mergers and/or acquisitions were announced. As 
explained in the discussion on choice of length of event window, positive average abnormal 
returns may be observed on days prior to the announcement day because of information 
leakage or rumours.  
The obtained results from this study suggest that the announcement of cross-border M&A will 
generate positive average abnormal returns for target firm shareholders on the first day 
subsequent to the announcement day. The empirical findings of this thesis suggest that target 
firms experience a small gain of 0.56% this day. This result may be due to the fact that news 
of some mergers and/or acquisitions reached the market after trading hours, making it 
impossible for market participants to react to the news on the actual announcement day. It is 
therefore possible that market reactions to some of the announcements have been delayed to 
                                                          
8
 The OLS estimators of the market model parameters used in this thesis is given in appendix C. 
9
 See appendix D for abnormal returns on the day in the event period 
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the following day. The positive effect on the day following the announcement day is however 
only significant at a 10% significance level when performing a t-test. 
The second day following the announcement day shows a negative average abnormal return 
of -0.02% for the target firms in the sample. A negative value of the test statistic will lead to a 
failure in rejecting the null hypothesis no matter how large in absolute value (Wooldridge, 
2009, p.123). We therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis that cross-border M&A 
announcements have no or a negative effect on the abnormal returns for target firm 
shareholders in Scandinavia on this day. It is therefore not possible to draw any conclusion 
about the second day following the announcement day. 
Average abnormal return for each day in the event window has been calculated and is 
depicted below. The graph shows that the main effect of cross-border M&A is isolated on the 
event day (t = 0).   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Average Abnormal Returns during event period 
Source: Own illustration using data collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
 
-2,00%
0,00%
2,00%
4,00%
6,00%
8,00%
10,00%
12,00%
14,00%
-2 -1 0 1 2
A
ve
ra
ge
 A
b
n
o
rm
al
 R
e
tu
rn
 
Days during event period 
Average Abnormal Returns during event period 
 
 
43 
 
Figure 3 indicates that the market reacts positively to the announcement of cross-border M&A 
in the short term, and that the most dramatic reaction from the market clearly comes at the 
actual day of announcement. The large difference between the average abnormal returns on 
the announcement day and the remaining days in the event period can be explained by the fact 
that the main part of the news on M&As comes on the announcement day. However, since the 
null hypothesis (that the announcement of cross-border M&A has no or a negative effect on 
target shareholders value on days t = -2 and t = -1) is rejected, the possibility that information 
on M&As reaches the market before the announcement day cannot be ruled out. 
In order to get a better picture of how substantial the market reaction to the news of M&A on 
the day of the event is, it can be helpful to look at the average abnormal returns during a 
period when no event occurs. The average abnormal returns during the estimation period for 
each of the stocks in the sample is depicted in figure 4 below, and shows that the average 
abnormal return fluctuates around zero in the absence of news on M&A.  
 
 
Figure 4: Average Abnormal Returns during estimation period 
Source: Own illustration using data collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, both parametric and non-parametric test statistics have 
been used to test inferences in this thesis. However, according to Berry, Gallinger & 
Henderson, Jr. (1990), researchers should exercise caution in drawing inferences from their 
use of non-parametric tests because of the nature of the residuals distribution. This suggests 
that parametric tests are preferable to non-parametric ones, and this thesis will therefore place 
emphasis on the results generated from the parametric test
10
. The main objective for the non-
parametric test used in the thesis is to confirm the results of the parametric test on the 
announcement day, which is the day when the main effect of cross-border M&A is observed.  
The following table shows the average abnormal return of the stocks in the sample for each of 
the days in the event window with their appropriate test statistics. 
 
Day of event period -2 -1 0 1 2 
Average Abnormal Return 1.18 % 0.96 % 12.01 % 0.56 % -0.02 % 
Parametric test 2.95 2.4 29.93 1.39 -0.04 
Non-parametric test -0.2 0 5.86 -0.2 -2.42 
 
Table 2: Average Abnormal Returns during the event period and test statistics 
The underlined numbers in the table are test statistics that are statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level. 
Source: Own calculation and illustration using data from Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
 
It is worth noticing that the average abnormal return on the first day following the 
announcement day (t = 1) is also statistically significant, but only at the 10% significance 
level. The test statistic of the non-parametric test on the announcement day (t = 0) is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level, and confirms that the average abnormal 
return on the announcement day is positive. 
In addition to calculating the average abnormal returns, the cumulative average abnormal 
return has been calculated for the event period by aggregating the average abnormal returns 
                                                          
10
 See appendix E for the variances of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns  
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over the event window, or equivalently, by aggregating the cumulative average returns for 
each security over the event window divided by the number of shares. This thesis found a 
cumulative average abnormal return of 14.7% over a five day period in the event window. 
This result indicates a substantial positive market reaction to the announcement of cross-
border M&A.  
The concept of a cumulative average abnormal return is necessary in order to capture the 
entire effect of the announcement of M&A since some of the market reaction to the news of 
M&A may come on the days surrounding the announcement day in the event window. The 
announcement effect of 14.7% is statistically significant at the 1% significance level using 
both parametric and non-parametric tests. The test statistics for the parametric and non-
parametric tests are θ1 = 16.38 and θ2 = 5.85 respectively.  
The empirical findings of this analysis thus show a positive and significant average abnormal 
return on the two days prior to the announcement, on the actual day of the announcement and 
on the first day following the announcement. These findings result in a statistically significant 
cumulative average abnormal return of 14.7% for the target firms during the event period. We 
can therefore, based on the results from this thesis, reject the null hypothesis that the 
announcement of cross-border M&A has a negative or no effect on target shareholders value 
in Scandinavia in the short-term. 
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7 Evaluation and suggestions for                                
further research 
 
Even though the findings from the empirical analysis in this thesis suggest that the 
announcement of cross-border M&A generates value to target firm shareholders in 
Scandinavia, a more extended research on mergers and acquisitions in Scandinavia would be 
useful in order to analyse the underlying factors of success and failure.  
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the effect of cross-border M&A 
announcements, where the effect on wealth of Scandinavian target firms has been the main 
aspect being analysed. Considering the scope of countries engaging in acquisitions of 
Scandinavian firms
11
, there are without doubt large differences in the political and legal 
systems, cultures, languages and corporate governance between the acquiring and target firms 
of the sample in this thesis. A larger sample of bidder and target firms would make it possible 
to test whether the negative spillover by law hypothesis is supported for cross-border M&A in 
the Scandinavian countries. This will imply that the value of the target assets could be 
reduced when they are in the hands of a bidder with less strict corporate governance 
regulation
12
. The alternate hypothesis, the positive spillover by law hypothesis, could also be 
fruitful to test, but would probably generate more interesting results if Scandinavian firms 
were to be treated as bidders instead of targets because of the quality of corporate governance 
standards in the countries. This hypothesis could be tested by looking at the abnormal share 
price returns of bidder and target in the period surrounding the announcement of an 
acquisition when the bidder is subject to better corporate governance than the target. Since 
improved governance is expected to generate additional value, this value creation should be 
reflected in the abnormal share price returns of both the bidder and the target
13
. 
A larger sample of bidder and target firms would also make it possible to test whether certain 
types of take-overs are more successful than others. This thesis has made no distinction 
between horizontal, vertical and conglomerate M&As
14
 when measuring the announcement 
effect of cross-border M&A on shareholders’ value due to limited access to data. However, if 
                                                          
11
 See appendix B 
12
 See section 2.3.3 
13
 See section 2.3.3 
14
 See section 2.1 
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granted access to more extensive information on the bidder and target firms, an interesting 
take on the investigation of cross-border M&A would be to study the difference in value 
generated to shareholders under the different types of M&A. The same goes for exploring the 
difference in value generated to shareholders in Scandinavia under friendly versus hostile 
take-overs.  
As explained in section 2.3.3, the success rate of acquisitions may in large scale depend on the 
due diligence process. An external financial advisor is often engaged in this process in order 
to help the acquirer find the right target. Event studies can be applied to investigate whether 
the cumulative abnormal return in the period surrounding the announcement day or the post-
acquisition period is higher for acquiring firms that had the help of a financial advisor in the 
acquisition process.  
Some of the mentioned suggestions for further research may give more interesting findings 
when looking at the effect of M&A in the long run. The same is true for an investigation of 
the effect of M&A when considering different methods of payment, such as cash payment and 
security payment, or mixed, since the method of payment has no impact on total short-run 
changes in value. However, the aspect of an acquisition deal which concerns the method of 
payment is very is interesting taking into account that prior research finds that shareholders of 
both target and bidding firms gain significantly more in cash than in equity offers (Danbolt & 
Maciver, 2012). 
An interesting alternative to the investigation of the effect of cross-border M&A on the wealth 
of Scandinavian target firms could be to study the same effect on the wealth of Scandinavian 
bidder firms, since studies show that the effect of M&A announcement on the wealth of the 
acquiring firms is unclear. As mentioned in the literature review, about half of the existing 
studies on the subject report zero or small returns for the acquirers in USA. An investigation 
of Scandinavian acquiring firms’ performance in the post-acquisition period may give new 
insight to previous studies, and may also be extended to include questions of why there might 
be a difference in the performance of acquiring and target firms.  
This study has omitted research on domestic deals within each of the Scandinavian countries 
since the research in this field is extensive compared to the analyses of cross-border deals. 
However, a comparison of the announcement effect of M&A in the cases of domestic and 
cross-border deals could be very relevant in order to see whether the benefits from acquiring 
or being acquired by a foreign firm exceed the obstacles connected with cross-border deals.  
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Another research area which is left unexplored for the Scandinavian market is the difference 
in post-acquisition performance between firms that engage in M&A, and firms that do not 
choose to engage in M&A. This type of analysis can be carried out by the use of the 
difference-in-difference methodology and propensity score matching methods (see e.g. 
Bertrand & Zitouna (2008)). An investigation of firms that choose to engage in M&A can 
bring further insight to firm specific factors of the relevant firms which may help to explain 
what characterizes the firms that choose to engage in M&A.   
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8 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the announcement effect of cross-border 
M&A on target firm shareholders value in Scandinavia in the short run. A sample of 98 
Scandinavian target firms has been analysed in the time span between 1997 and 2011 in order 
to find empirical evidence that support the hypothesis that announcement of cross-border 
M&A generates value for target firm shareholders in Scandinavia in the short run.  
The event study methodology was applied in order to analyse abnormal returns to target 
shareholders over a period of five days surrounding the announcement day of cross-border 
M&A in Scandinavia. The objective of choosing a short event period, under which the returns 
of the stocks are examined, is that there will generally be no information other than the news 
of the merger or acquisition during this period, and the observed returns should therefore be 
entirely due to this news.  
This study finds that the announcement of cross-border M&A generates a significant positive 
value for target firm shareholders in Scandinavia in the short run. The empirical results 
obtained from the event study methodology suggest that target firm shareholders in 
Scandinavia receive a substantial significant and positive average abnormal return on the 
announcement day of cross-border M&A.  
The findings of this thesis also suggest significant and positive abnormal returns on both of 
the days prior to the announcement day. The positive abnormal returns on the days in the 
event period that are prior to the announcement day may have been observed be due to 
dissemination of  news of some of the takeovers before the actual day of announcement, 
which often occur due to insider trade or rumours. 
 In addition to the positive average abnormal returns observed two days prior to the 
announcement day, the analysis finds empirical evidence that target shareholders experience a 
positive and significant average abnormal return on the first day following the announcement 
of the takeovers. A positive average abnormal return on the day following the announcement 
day may have been observed due to situations where the market has been unable to respond to 
the news of M&A on the actual day of the announcement, which is often the case when 
M&As are announced after trading hours. Since the market is not able to respond to the news 
on the announcement day, the effect of the announcement will be delayed until the next day.  
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According to the findings in this thesis, target firm shareholders experience a small negative 
average abnormal return on the second day following the announcement day. However, the 
result obtained on the last day of the event period is not statistically significantly different 
from zero. It is therefore not possible to draw any conclusions on whether the announcement 
of M&A has an effect on target firm shareholders value on the second day after the 
announcement.  
The combined average abnormal returns on each of the days in the event period result in a 
significant and positive cumulative average abnormal return. The objective of calculating the 
cumulative average abnormal return is to capture the whole effect of the announcement of 
cross-border M&A; which is found to be 14.7% for the event period in this study.  
Empirical evidences in this thesis thus suggest that cross-border M&A announcements will 
generate value for target shareholders in Scandinavia in the short-run. The observed effect of 
positive market reactions to the news of cross-border M&A reflect changes in expected future 
cash-flows to shareholders due to the positive effects which may emerge from a take-over. 
The results obtained in this thesis are consistent with prior empirical findings on the 
announcement effect of cross-border M&A on target shareholders’ value.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
Table A.1:  
Number of inward M&As in Sweden in the time span between 1997 and 2011              
 
  
Year No of inward M&As in Sweden 
1997 38 
1998 121 
1999 124 
2000 129 
2001 131 
2002 99 
2003 70 
2004 90 
2005 121 
2006 140 
2007 121 
2008 134 
2009 76 
2010 93 
2011 109 
Total 1596 
                                   Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
Table A.2:  
Number of inward M&As in Norway in the time span between 1997 and 2011       
  Year No of inward M&As in Norway 
1997 15 
1998 67 
1999 70 
2000 79 
2001 64 
2002 45 
2003 59 
2004 54 
2005 60 
2006 67 
2007 71 
2008 81 
2009 43 
2010 56 
2011 56 
Total 887 
                                   Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
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Table A.3:  
Number of inward M&As in Denmark in the time span between 1997 and 2011      
  Year No of inward M&As in Denmark 
1997 32 
1998 70 
1999 52 
2000 73 
2001 67 
2002 46 
2003 59 
2004 68 
2005 76 
2006 88 
2007 68 
2008 66 
2009 57 
2010 64 
2011 56 
Total 942 
    Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
Table A.4:  
Total number of inward M&As in Scandinavia in the time span between 1997 and 2011 
  
Year 
Total number of inward M&As 
in Scandinavia 
1997 85 
1998 258 
1999 246 
2000 281 
2001 262 
2002 190 
2003 188 
2004 212 
2005 257 
2006 295 
2007 260 
2008 281 
2009 176 
2010 213 
2011 221 
Total 3425 
   Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
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Appendix B: 
Table B.1: Number of cross-border M&As in Sweden by country of acquirer 
Target: Sweden 
 Country No of take-overs in Sweden 
USA 251 
Norway 242 
Finland 218 
Great Britain 202 
Denmark 191 
Germany 102 
France 73 
Netherlands 71 
Canada 42 
Switzerland 34 
Italy 23 
Belgium 22 
Iceland 12 
Austria 11 
Ireland 11 
Japan 10 
India 9 
Singapore 9 
Luxemborg 8 
Australia 7 
Bermuda 7 
Poland 5 
Spain 5 
China 3 
Greece 3 
Hong Kong 3 
South Africa 3 
Cyprus 2 
Israel 2 
Lithuania 2 
Maltha 2 
Russian Federation 2 
Turkey 2 
Brazil 1 
Cayman Islands 1 
Colombia 1 
Costa Rica 1 
Saudi Arabia 1 
Taiwan 1 
Unites Arab 
Emirates 1 
Total 1596 
                                                Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Table B.2: Number of cross-border M&As in Norway by country of acquirer. 
Target: Norway 
 Country No of take-overs in Norway 
Sweden 230 
USA 129 
Denmark 118 
Great Britain 97 
Finland 69 
Germany 41 
Netherlands 39 
France 27 
Canada 15 
Iceland 15 
Switzerland 13 
Belgium 12 
Bermuda 8 
Italy 8 
Cyprus 6 
Australia 5 
Austria 5 
Spain 5 
Greece 4 
Ireland 4 
Japan 4 
China 3 
India 3 
Marshall Irelands 3 
Singapore 3 
Bahrain 2 
Brazil 2 
Cayman Islands 2 
Israel 2 
Luxemborg 2 
Malaysia 2 
Poland 2 
Hungary 1 
Oman 1 
Portugal 1 
Russian Federation 1 
Saudi Arabia 1 
South Africa 1 
South Koreas 1 
Total 887 
                                                Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
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Table B.3: Number of cross-border M&As in Denmark by country of acquirer. 
Target: Denmark 
 Country No of  take-overs in Denmark 
Sweden 228 
USA 142 
Norway 100 
Great Britain 96 
Germany 82 
Netherlands 55 
Finland 39 
Switzerland 32 
France 31 
Iceland 30 
Belgium 11 
Italy 10 
Austria 9 
Ireland 8 
Luxemborg 7 
India 6 
Russian Federation 6 
Australia 5 
Canada 5 
Cyprus 4 
Japan 3 
Poland 3 
Singapore 3 
Virgin Islands 3 
Bermuda 2 
Faroe Islands 2 
Israel 2 
Spain 2 
Taiwan 2 
Bahamas 1 
Bahrain 1 
Barbados 1 
Brazil 1 
Chile 1 
Croatia 1 
Czech Republic 1 
Kuwait 1 
Liechtenstein 1 
Mexico 1 
Portugal 1 
Quatar 1 
Thailand 1 
Turkey 1 
Total 942 
                                                  Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
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Appendix C  
Table C.1: OLS estimators of the market model parameters 
 
Firm i     
1 ,001 ,994 
2 ,002 ,764 
3 -,003 ,822 
4 ,000 ,631 
5 -,004 ,830 
6 ,001 1,065 
7 ,000 ,186 
8 ,002 ,555 
9 -,001 ,236 
10 ,000 ,174 
11 ,000 ,775 
12 ,001 1,302 
13 ,001 ,112 
14 -,002 1,145 
15 ,001 ,166 
16 ,000 ,527 
17 ,000 1,049 
19 ,003 ,446 
20 ,000 ,408 
21 -,001 1,242 
22 ,002 ,533 
23 ,002 ,177 
18 ,001 ,494 
24 ,003 ,381 
25 ,001 1,294 
26 -,001 1,472 
27 -,002 ,701 
28 ,000 1,238 
29 ,001 ,216 
30 ,001 ,027 
31 ,002 ,309 
32 ,000 ,536 
33 -,003 ,786 
34 ,002 ,038 
35 ,000 ,076 
36 ,000 ,130 
37 -,001 1,238 
38 ,001 1,845 
39 ,002 ,557 
40 ,002 ,385 
 ̂ ̂ 
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41 -,003 ,855 
42 ,000 1,407 
43 ,002 ,422 
44 -,004 ,463 
45 ,001 ,053 
46 ,001 ,456 
47 ,000 ,376 
48 -,001 ,541 
49 ,000 ,228 
50 ,000 ,181 
51 -,002 ,378 
52 -,003 ,481 
53 ,002 ,375 
54 ,000 ,061 
55 ,000 ,760 
56 ,000 ,534 
57 -,001 ,176 
58 -,002 ,368 
59 ,001 ,226 
60 ,003 ,455 
61 ,001 ,387 
62 ,000 ,611 
63 -,011 1,391 
64 ,000 ,070 
65 ,004 ,355 
66 ,000 ,763 
67 -,001 ,592 
68 -,004 1,008 
69 ,000 ,199 
70 ,001 ,922 
71 -,001 ,666 
72 -,002 ,698 
73 ,002 ,472 
74 -,006 1,161 
75 -,001 ,160 
76 ,000 -,203 
77 -,004 ,838 
78 -,002 ,878 
79 -,005 ,318 
80 -,003 ,666 
81 -,001 ,076 
82 ,000 ,091 
83 -,012 ,523 
84 -,002 ,483 
85 ,000 ,156 
86 ,000 -,037 
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87 -,006 -,074 
88 -,002 ,558 
89 ,000 1,176 
90 ,001 ,169 
91 ,002 ,252 
92 ,000 -,048 
93 -,001 ,174 
94 -,002 1,172 
95 ,001 ,507 
96 ,000 ,121 
97 -,002 ,473 
98 ,001 ,182 
 
                    See section 5.4 for the formula used to estimate the market model parameters                 
                    Source: Own calculation of OLS estimators based on data collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
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Appendix D 
 
Table D.1: Abnormal returns of the stocks in the sample during the event period 
 
Firm i 
    
                   
∑   ̂     it 
       1 -0,36 % 0,66 % -0,63 % -0,72 % -0,87 % -1,91 % 
2 -0,06 % -0,82 % 1,06 % 3,32 % 0,61 % 4,11 % 
3 1,07 % 0,79 % 0,61 % -1,28 % -0,15 % 1,03 % 
4 -1,18 % 2,06 % 4,91 % 0,24 % 0,12 % 6,15 % 
5 0,92 % -0,01 % 6,15 % 2,59 % 1,59 % 11,23 % 
6 4,00 % 3,92 % 10,50 % -0,22 % -0,02 % 18,17 % 
7 0,71 % 17,33 % 0,77 % 1,60 % -0,75 % 19,65 % 
8 0,62 % 1,92 % 1,59 % 1,59 % -0,47 % 5,25 % 
9 0,53 % 1,64 % 37,03 % -1,20 % 0,14 % 38,14 % 
10 0,88 % 0,20 % -13,80 % -4,67 % 1,04 % -16,34 % 
11 -0,25 % -1,09 % 6,96 % 1,09 % -0,36 % 6,35 % 
12 -0,37 % -0,81 % 2,77 % 1,32 % 0,52 % 3,44 % 
13 -0,40 % 4,05 % 24,67 % -0,51 % -0,18 % 27,64 % 
14 -0,25 % -0,30 % 10,27 % 2,53 % 1,68 % 13,93 % 
15 6,49 % -1,31 % 27,92 % -4,17 % -0,89 % 28,05 % 
16 -1,13 % 0,73 % 6,70 % -0,29 % -0,34 % 5,66 % 
17 -0,63 % 2,23 % 3,56 % 1,01 % 1,70 % 7,87 % 
18 -0,18 % 0,83 % 4,57 % -0,20 % -0,57 % 4,44 % 
19 0,57 % -0,76 % 16,45 % -0,84 % 0,31 % 15,72 % 
20 0,56 % 2,82 % 2,18 % -0,14 % -1,57 % 3,86 % 
21 -0,49 % -2,65 % -1,55 % 1,04 % 3,39 % -0,26 % 
22 -0,44 % 0,45 % -0,83 % 0,10 % -4,84 % -5,56 % 
23 -1,20 % 6,17 % 20,42 % 0,41 % 0,14 % 25,94 % 
24 5,19 % 2,03 % 4,78 % -0,28 % 1,78 % 13,51 % 
25 4,38 % -0,41 % 13,87 % -7,21 % -0,09 % 10,54 % 
26 -0,85 % 1,09 % 25,09 % -0,30 % -0,17 % 24,85 % 
27 -0,91 % 0,24 % 49,35 % -0,20 % 1,47 % 49,95 % 
28 1,75 % 2,86 % 6,19 % -7,61 % 0,90 % 4,09 % 
29 0,76 % -0,11 % 14,35 % 0,98 % -0,22 % 15,77 % 
30 -0,34 % 0,13 % 92,15 % -0,13 % -0,13 % 91,69 % 
31 -0,12 % -0,48 % 2,86 % -0,21 % 0,10 % 2,16 % 
32 -0,45 % -0,49 % 2,57 % 0,60 % 0,93 % 3,16 % 
33 1,43 % -4,11 % 21,56 % 4,12 % -1,76 % 21,23 % 
34 -0,20 % -0,18 % 0,83 % -0,33 % -0,03 % 0,08 % 
35 -0,11 % 0,05 % 0,65 % -0,34 % -0,13 % 0,11 % 
36 6,16 % -3,07 % 20,35 % -1,03 % 0,37 % 22,78 % 
37 -1,49 % -0,97 % 35,12 % -0,34 % -3,23 % 29,09 % 
      ̂i(-2)       ̂i(-1)       ̂i0       ̂i1       ̂i2 
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38 0,38 % 0,15 % -25,36 % -7,32 % 4,86 % -27,28 % 
39 -2,92 % -0,47 % 5,42 % -1,57 % -0,79 % -0,32 % 
40 -4,11 % 3,62 % 10,70 % -0,26 % -0,01 % 9,94 % 
41 0,60 % -0,73 % 1,38 % 0,45 % 3,27 % 4,96 % 
42 -1,48 % -4,43 % 5,68 % 6,01 % -0,43 % 5,34 % 
43 4,01 % 1,59 % -7,32 % 0,37 % -0,50 % -1,85 % 
44 -6,30 % -0,31 % 83,77 % -0,61 % 0,30 % 76,84 % 
45 0,47 % -0,14 % 0,62 % -0,15 % -0,03 % 0,78 % 
46 4,24 % 15,98 % 1,26 % 0,26 % 1,53 % 23,25 % 
47 6,31 % -0,03 % 37,23 % 0,30 % -5,46 % 38,34 % 
48 0,56 % 0,52 % 40,48 % 0,38 % -0,40 % 41,53 % 
49 -0,40 % -0,21 % -0,18 % -0,42 % 0,54 % -0,68 % 
50 -0,45 % 0,17 % 27,25 % 1,21 % -0,49 % 27,69 % 
51 -1,40 % 0,87 % 4,02 % -2,81 % 11,13 % 11,80 % 
52 -2,18 % 1,17 % -4,49 % 2,65 % -3,07 % -5,92 % 
53 0,72 % -1,68 % 0,18 % -0,24 % -0,25 % -1,26 % 
54 0,03 % 0,03 % 0,08 % 55,49 % -0,58 % 55,04 % 
55 10,26 % 0,20 % 6,47 % 1,01 % -2,72 % 15,22 % 
56 1,08 % -1,48 % 0,44 % -1,27 % -0,41 % -1,63 % 
57 0,08 % -0,38 % 5,24 % -5,86 % -1,97 % -2,90 % 
58 1,43 % 0,92 % 11,97 % -4,36 % -2,09 % 7,88 % 
59 12,54 % -0,07 % 36,02 % -0,88 % -0,09 % 47,52 % 
60 -2,36 % 31,11 % 6,36 % -0,32 % 0,66 % 35,45 % 
61 -0,25 % 0,37 % 26,39 % -2,33 % -2,54 % 21,63 % 
62 3,09 % -2,40 % 23,65 % -0,83 % -0,13 % 23,38 % 
63 -0,93 % 3,29 % -2,57 % 3,46 % 4,54 % 7,79 % 
64 2,62 % -0,37 % 77,39 % 0,08 % -0,11 % 79,62 % 
65 -0,64 % 22,31 % 0,68 % 1,56 % -0,69 % 23,22 % 
66 0,49 % 1,27 % 18,28 % 1,62 % -1,05 % 20,61 % 
67 3,20 % 0,12 % 21,10 % -10,10 % 5,49 % 19,82 % 
68 -0,69 % 1,75 % 6,60 % 2,60 % -1,03 % 9,23 % 
69 0,27 % 8,64 % 4,44 % -2,01 % 1,59 % 12,93 % 
70 0,14 % -2,92 % 48,09 % -0,84 % -0,78 % 43,69 % 
71 0,46 % -0,07 % 0,00 % 0,21 % -0,15 % 0,45 % 
72 3,13 % -2,96 % -1,67 % -2,34 % -2,84 % -6,69 % 
73 -0,70 % -0,28 % 2,04 % 0,00 % -1,77 % -0,70 % 
74 2,84 % 1,05 % 0,36 % 3,26 % -0,04 % 7,47 % 
75 -0,01 % 0,00 % 0,40 % 1,04 % 0,46 % 1,89 % 
76 47,31 % 0,65 % 0,22 % -0,12 % -0,03 % 48,03 % 
77 -5,12 % 11,06 % 0,56 % 35,19 % -0,66 % 41,03 % 
78 1,51 % 0,75 % -3,34 % -4,99 % -7,78 % -13,85 % 
79 15,01 % 0,67 % 120,45 % 1,08 % 1,90 % 139,12 % 
80 -1,43 % -5,38 % 62,35 % -26,72 % -5,78 % 23,03 % 
81 -0,67 % -0,65 % 30,72 % 0,07 % 0,13 % 29,60 % 
82 -1,58 % -5,28 % 36,86 % -0,09 % -0,26 % 29,65 % 
83 0,17 % -4,80 % -8,41 % 14,64 % 0,64 % 2,24 % 
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84 10,75 % -10,78 % -9,02 % 9,24 % 10,87 % 11,05 % 
85 0,16 % -1,47 % -1,55 % -0,23 % -2,66 % -5,74 % 
86 -0,03 % -0,09 % 0,37 % 0,08 % 0,00 % 0,33 % 
87 0,89 % 0,64 % 0,29 % 0,46 % 0,11 % 2,38 % 
88 0,48 % 14,48 % 1,23 % 0,55 % -6,13 % 10,61 % 
89 -3,89 % -0,96 % 4,45 % -0,70 % 1,50 % 0,40 % 
90 -0,27 % -0,52 % -0,65 % 0,18 % -0,11 % -1,37 % 
91 -0,13 % -2,43 % 0,73 % -0,08 % -0,93 % -2,84 % 
92 -0,05 % 0,03 % -0,02 % 0,04 % 0,01 % 0,02 % 
93 -2,15 % -0,16 % 11,84 % 0,31 % -0,87 % 8,98 % 
94 -0,72 % -10,76 % 1,01 % 4,91 % 7,60 % 2,05 % 
95 -0,14 % -0,14 % -0,72 % 0,69 % -0,47 % -0,78 % 
96 1,20 % -0,04 % -0,58 % -2,25 % -0,43 % -2,11 % 
97 -0,69 % -1,45 % -0,24 % 0,76 % -0,08 % -1,71 % 
98 -3,42 % 0,31 % -4,09 % -6,26 % -2,22 % -15,68 % 
     
           See section 5.4 for formula used to calculate abnormal returns 
           Source: Own calculation of abnormal returns based on data collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
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Appendix E 
Table E.1: Variances of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for each of 
the stocks in the sample 
Firm i     
1 0,00027 0,00136 
2 0,00031 0,00154 
3 0,00131 0,00655 
4 0,00024 0,00119 
5 0,00058 0,00289 
6 0,00103 0,00514 
7 0,00094 0,00469 
8 0,00056 0,00281 
9 0,00046 0,00231 
10 0,00045 0,00226 
11 0,00028 0,00141 
12 0,00044 0,00219 
13 0,00080 0,00398 
14 0,00147 0,00733 
15 0,00033 0,00165 
16 0,00026 0,00131 
17 0,00154 0,00768 
18 0,00016 0,00082 
19 0,00041 0,00206 
20 0,00045 0,00227 
21 0,00067 0,00335 
22 0,00306 0,01530 
23 0,00027 0,00133 
24 0,00112 0,00561 
25 0,00074 0,00369 
26 0,00133 0,00664 
27 0,00091 0,00453 
28 0,00141 0,00705 
29 0,00040 0,00199 
30 0,00005 0,00023 
31 0,00047 0,00233 
32 0,00044 0,00221 
33 0,00052 0,00261 
34 0,00026 0,00128 
35 0,00010 0,00048 
36 0,00061 0,00307 
37 0,00060 0,00301 
38 0,00259 0,01293 
39 0,00061 0,00305 
 ̂
εi
2
  ̂
i
2
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40 0,00045 0,00227 
41 0,00328 0,01640 
42 0,00162 0,00811 
43 0,00250 0,01250 
44 0,00047 0,00234 
45 0,00174 0,00871 
46 0,00180 0,00902 
47 0,00033 0,00163 
48 0,00048 0,00242 
49 0,00074 0,00372 
50 0,00024 0,00122 
51 0,00283 0,01413 
52 0,00142 0,00708 
53 0,00074 0,00371 
54 0,00142 0,00710 
55 0,00109 0,00546 
56 0,00297 0,01484 
57 0,00135 0,00676 
58 0,00403 0,02016 
59 0,00166 0,00831 
60 0,00101 0,00506 
61 0,00145 0,00727 
62 0,00037 0,00185 
63 0,01407 0,07036 
64 0,00010 0,00050 
65 0,00393 0,01963 
66 0,00101 0,00504 
67 0,00175 0,00877 
68 0,00319 0,01595 
69 0,00137 0,00686 
70 0,00046 0,00231 
71 0,00307 0,01536 
72 0,00077 0,00387 
73 0,00095 0,00477 
74 0,00374 0,01871 
75 0,00074 0,00369 
76 0,00051 0,00254 
77 0,00250 0,01251 
78 0,00243 0,01216 
79 0,00405 0,02024 
80 0,00391 0,01954 
81 0,00050 0,00251 
82 0,00117 0,00587 
83 0,00559 0,02793 
84 0,00076 0,00382 
85 0,00043 0,00217 
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86 0,00097 0,00487 
87 0,01602 0,08008 
88 0,00385 0,01927 
89 0,00240 0,01199 
90 0,00027 0,00135 
91 0,00040 0,00200 
92 0,00042 0,00210 
93 0,00064 0,00319 
94 0,00112 0,00562 
95 0,00684 0,03421 
96 0,00040 0,00199 
97 0,00064 0,00320 
98 0,00117 0,00587 
 
See section 5.4 for formulas used to calculate the variances   
Source: Own calculation based on data collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
